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Abstract

Economic reform that began in 1978 became a landmark in the evolution of the
Chinese economy. The Chinese economy then gradually transferred from a planned
economy to a market-oriented economy. I mainly focus on China’s business cycles and
monetary policy after 1978 in this paper.
I use GDP growth to measure the Chinese business cycle. Instead of the level of
GDP, the business cycles in the thesis I am talking about are ups and downs in the rate of
growth.
In Chapter Two, I illustrated all five business cycles which have occurred over the
past 30 years. I also introduced some of China’s financial background in Chapter Three,
including institutional condition, banking system, economic reform and existing
problems. This background introduction gives a clearer picture of China’s financial
situation and implementation of monetary policy. In Chapter Four, I analyzed some
aspects of China’s monetary policy such as the credit plan, interest rate, and exchange
rate. Chapter Five discussed China’s inflation situation and some relevant monetary
policy decisions.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
China had a planned economy from 1949 to 1977. Economic reform that began in
1978 became a landmark in the evolution of the Chinese economy. The Chinese
economic reform began in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist Party of
China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping.The Chinese economy then gradually transferred
from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy.
I use GDP growth to measure the Chinese business cycle in this paper. Boom time
happens when GDP growth rate goes up. That’s because after economic reform, China’s
GDP growth rate has always been positive. So instead of the level of GDP, the business
cycles in the thesis I am talking about are ups and downs in the rate of growth.
China experienced five business cycles between 1978 and 2008. With the deepening
of reform, the pattern of the Chinese business cycle changed gradually. The amplitude of
business cycles was smaller and the fluctuation of the economy was less volatile with
high GDP growth rate. Decentralization was a very important policy in Chinese
economic reform. According to our research, the trigger of the Chinese business cycle
was gradually transferred from central government to local government. Through
economic reform, China retained its central bank while allowing private enterprise. Not
only has the economic system changed but there have also been improvements in
investment and foreign trade that have impacted China's economy significantly. We do
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realize that China has achieved impressive progress during economic reform. Huge
progress can be largely attributed to economic policies China has implemented. But
within this progress, we identified many issues. The policy efficiency and problems can
be highly related to China’s financial conditions. In Chapter Three, I focus on the
Institutional Conditions of Monetary policy in China. I analyze China’s financial
organization, including the reform process and structure of the banking system. During
China’s business cycle analysis, economic policy is one of the most important factors. In
this thesis, I mainly focus on China’s monetary policy including the credit plan, interest
rate policy, and exchange rate policy which are discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five
is about the causes of inflation and the ability of monetary policy to deal with inflation.
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CHAPTER TWO: BUSINESS CYCLES IN CHINA
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and had a planned
economy. Economic reform took place in 1978 and is a landmark of evolution of the
Chinese economy. Chinese economic reform was began in December 1978 by reformists
within the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping.The Chinese
economy then gradually transferred from a planned economy to a market-oriented
economy.
Five Business Cycles after 1978
According to the official data reported in Table 1, the Chinese economy experienced
five business cycles between 1978 and 2008.The first cycle started in 1978 and lasted
until 1981. The second business cycle lasted 4 years, from 1982 to 1986; the third cycle
started in 1987 and lasted until 1990; the fourth cycle lasted nine years from 1990 to1999;
the fifth cycle started in 2000. We can define Chinese business cycles based on the GDP
growth rate. We can see that there were peaks happened in 1984, 1987, 1992 and there
were troughs happened in 1981, 1986, 1990 and 1999.
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Table 1 China GDP Growth Rates (1978-2008)
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China）

Figure 1 GDP Growth Rate (1978-2008)
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China）
As we can see from Table 1 and Figure 1, the first three cycles are very short in
length. The first three business cycles lasted four years, five years and four years
respectively. The duration became longer after 1990. The length of the fourth business
cycle was nine years. The length of the fifth cycle was longer than nine years. Also, the
shape of the last two business cycles became flatter and less volatile.
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The First Business Cycle:1978-1981
According to Figure1, the length of the first business cycle was four years. The
government’s policy at that time was intended to introduce a market economy to the
current planned economy. This was the first business cycle after economic reform.
Although market economy policies had been introduced into the economy, the planned
economy still played the main role during this business cycle. Reform policies during this
period were mainly for rural areas. Development began in the agriculture industry.
Improvement of agriculture ameliorated a serious imbalance among agriculture, light
industry and heavy industry in the composition of the economy.
In the meantime, political stability has increased since 1977. Investment also
increased in 1977 and reached its peak in 1978. During The Third Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee of the Party, government introduced the slogan “adjust, reform,
amend, improve”. In order to drive economic growth, government arbitrarily invested
heavily in industry. Investment soared but unfortunately, the stimulation of investment
failed due to the bold investment target and lack of consideration. The economy ended up
with high inflation and financial deficits. Poor development of the primary industry and
the third industry with a fast growth of industry induced an imbalanced economic
development. In 1978 and 1979, fixed investment reached 69.936 billion RMB and 74.59
billion RMB which corresponds to an increase of 4.58 percent and 6.65 percent,
respectively. In the same period, the fiscal deficit grew from 17 billion RMB in 1979 and
12.7 billion RMB in 1980.In order to finance this unaffordable investment, the
government forced the People's Bank of China to issue 13.4 billion RMB. The CPI
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soared 6% in 1980. In 1981, the government changed the economic target from
developing industry to eliminating the fiscal deficit. Fixed investment dropped by
10.51% percent to 66.751 billion RMB.
In this period, state-owned enterprises began to have the power to decide their own
business strategy. This reform improved the competitive strength and profitability of
state-owned enterprises. Government also increased the procurement price of agricultural
by-products in order to improve the income of farmers. Although these policies benefited
the expansion of the economy, the financial burden of the government became severe.
The Second Business Cycle: 1982-1986
The second business cycle started in 1982 and ended in 1986. As we can see in
Figure1, the peak of GDP growth rate reached 15.2% in 1984 during this business cycle.
Expansion started in 1982 and lasted until 1984. Depression also lasted two years, from
1985 to 1986. The fluctuation during this period was not very volatile which means the
economy of China during this business cycle was comparatively stable.
Investment kept expanding during this business cycle. Since 1982, fixed investment
was greater than 100 billion RMB. Because investment grew so rapidly, the economy
became overheated in 1984. According to the Statistical Report of National Economy and
Social Development in 1985 issued by the National bureau of Statistics of China, the total
demand soared and become unsustainable. Total demand exceeded total supply. Imports
also expanded rapidly. The CPI rose to 9.3% in 1985. In 1986, in order to stabilize the
economy, government decided to tighten investments. Investment dropped in 1986.
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Since the Chinese economy changed from a planned economy to a market economy,
the total salary in the entire economy started to increase. Consumption began to play an
important role in this business cycle.
Salary
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Table 2 Consumption and Salary Growth Rate（1981-1986）
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China）
As GDP grew, consumption in this business cycle also increased tremendously. The
growth rate of consumption reached 25.26% in 1985. But the total supply of the Chinese
economy didn’t match the growth of consumption and income. The main problem during
the second business cycle was that the total demand exceeded the total supply: fixed
investment was overheated; purchasing power exceeded stock supply; the level of
imports increased too quickly. The CPI grew rapidly.
Government implemented a new policy in the rural area in 1981. Family Contract
Responsibility System replaced the old public-owned agriculture economy in the rural
area. Local managers became responsible for the profit and losses of the enterprise. This
privatization of agriculture started at the beginning of the reform. Compared with
agriculture, the industrial sector began to privatize in 1990s. After handing in a quota of
output to the government, farmers could keep the rest of their output as private property.
8

Chinese agriculture entered a boom. Private enterprises and town and village enterprises
(TVEs) expanded rapidly. Since 1979, governments have pointed out that TVEs are one
important part in the economy. The Regulation of Town and Village Enterprises
Development Problems which was enacted in 1979 enacted a series of policies to support
the TVE’s development, including low or no taxes, subsidies, low interest rate loans, etc.
Banks started to play an important role. Enterprise investment was financed by State
funds. Bank loans replaced a large part of state funds and became the main financing
channel for enterprises investment. A significant expansion in loans also contributed to
the overheated economy.
Industry reached an 18% growth rate in 1985, much greater than the government’s
8% target. In order to support the high growth of industry, China had to increase the
import of materials. This unexpected increase of imports caused a 1.27 billion RMB trade
deficit. (Liu Jiangyao, 2009)
The Third Business Cycle: 1987-1990
The third business cycle lasted from 1987 to 1990. Expansion was recorded in 1987
and 1988, and the depression started in 1989 and lasted until 1990. During this business
cycle, the average GDP growth rate was 7.8%, salary increased 7.5% and the average
growth rate of agricultural and industry output was 11%. Despite the rapid growth of the
Chinese economy, it still faced many serious problems. During 1986 and 1987, the loans
for fixed investment increased by 43% which was much higher than the national income
growth rate of 32%. The cash that banks used to pay salary and personal expenses in
1987 was 40.6% higher than in 1985. (Liu Jiangyao, 2005). The economy was overheated.
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Inflation became serious. On the other hand, the average growth rate of agriculture in this
cycle was 4.2%, whereas the average industry growth rate was 16.9%. The average
amount of grain per-capita dropped from 395.5 kilograms in1984 to 376 kilograms in
1987. This insufficient food supply induced a rising grain price. There was serious
imbalance between agriculture and industry. In the same period, basic industry and
infrastructure were poor. Train were overloaded and coal and steel were in short supply.
Because of this serious imbalance in the economy, the Chinese government made a
policy adjustment in 1988. China loosened the credit policy as they assumed that the
main factor inducing the increase in the CPI was the increased prices of food. Inflation
became more serious as the CPI reached 11.8 in 1988. Serious inflation induced a panic.
People rushed to supermarkets to snap up food and went to banks to withdrawal cash.
The government began to tighten monetary policy in 1989. The CPI went down gradually.
Supply and demand became comparatively stable.
The Forth Business Cycle: 1991-1999
This business cycle lasted 8 years. Expansion began in 1991 and lasted through 1992.
The depression lasted 7 years from 1993 to 1999. Compared to the previous business
cycle, the duration of the fourth business cycle was nearly two times as long, the average
GDP level was comparatively high and volatility was low. This means that during this
period, the Chinese economy was relatively stable.
During 1989 to 1991, China tightened both monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Budgets and investment decreased and prices dropped. The entire national economy
suffered from recession. The profit of enterprises decreased. Government faced a huge
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fiscal deficit (The report of performance of budget plan in 1991 and the drafted budget in
1992, 1992). In order to improve the economy, The Chinese government implemented
active fiscal policy to stimulate industry and social demand. As we can see in Table 1,
fixed investment increased by 23.85% in 1991. In the meantime, government also
devaluated RMB to increase exports and improve international trade. In 1991 the
economy began to grow at a much more rapid rate. GDP growth rate rose to 9.2% in
1991; agriculture increased by 3%, and industry grew by 14.2%.
In 1992, President Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour speech pointed out that
technology and science needed to be boosted, and reforms needed to be implemented
more rapidly. In 1992 GDP growth rate rose to 23.61%, fixed investment increased
44.43% and industry increased 20.8 %.( statistical report of national economy and social
development in 1992, 1993)
The recession during this business cycle started in 1993 and lasted 7 years.
Compared to the first 3 business cycles, the recession in the fourth business cycle was
much less severe. The overheated economy induced unstable fluctuation in the economic
system. Overinvestment led to a high unsustainable industry growth rate, high price level
and an insufficient of materials and natural resources. The Chinese government adopted
new policies immediately to cool down the economy. Reform included: separation of the
central bank from commercial banks, encouragement of the development of private
enterprises, adoption of a tax sharing system, and implementation of different policies in
different industries. During a 4-year adjustment, the investment growth rate dropped and
the CPI returned to a comparatively low level. Most importantly, the economy kept
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growing at a fast pace. With this low CPI and high economic growth rate, Chinese
economy finished its “soft landing”.
The fifth business cycle: 2000-2008
The duration of the fifth business cycle was more than 9 years. Expansion lasted 8
years. Economic growth rate reached 11.9% in 2007 and recession started in 2008. The
economic fluctuations were less volatile during this business cycle. The amplitude of the
business cycle was comparatively small. GDP level was high. These characteristic
indicated that the development of Chinese economy was healthy and that the expansion
of different industries was balanced. Macro policy was the main factor which affected
this business cycle.
The Chinese government carried out a pro-active fiscal and monetary policy to
create economic incentives after the Asian financial crisis. Government issued 864.3
billion Yuan in treasury bonds at the end of 2004. Agriculture, forestry, transportation,
ecology etc. had improved rapidly. In the meantime, government lowered the tax rate to
stimulate investment, consumption and foreign trade. Ameliorating income distribution
also increased social demand. The Economy grew very fast between 2000 and 2004. The
government implemented a steady monetary and fiscal policy instead of a pro-active
economic policy after 2004. Economic policy changed because the Chinese economy did
not suffer from either insufficient demand or deflation after 2004. The government
decided to adopt a prudent fiscal policy to avoid an overheated economy. The countercyclical economic policies implemented by the government stabilized the economy. This
was the main reason that the fifth business cycle was less volatile.
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The typical characteristics of Chinese business cycles
Based on the GDP growth rate, we use “trough-to-trough” measure to calculate the
duration of business cycles. China used to have a planned economy before 1978. The
government controlled the whole economy. Government investment led to economic
fluctuation. The duration of business cycles was a function of the economic plan
implemented by the government.
GDP

GDP

GDP
Year

GDP
growth

Year

(100 million)

growth
(100 million)

rate
1952

679

1953

824.189657

1954

rate
1965

1717.203777
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21.38%
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1873.078613
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859.384232

4.27%
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5.98%
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-2.82%
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3.92%
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7.69%
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1972
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1960
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1.19%
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8.03%

1961
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1974
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2.58%

1962

1151.239035

-5.71%

1975

3013.110833

7.47%

1963
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7.39%

1976

2961.472658

-1.71%

1964

1455.539374

17.73%

1977

3221.051773

8.77%

Table 3 GDP Growth Rate (1952-1977)
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Figure 2 GDP Growth Rate (1952-1977)
According to Wenxian Gao who mentioned in the “ A Discussion about Business
Cycle Fluctuation after 1949” , Chinese business cycles between 1949 and 1976 can be
divided into some smaller business cycles: 1953-1957; 1958-1961, 1962-1967, 19681972 and 1973-1976. I selected the date from 1953 to 1976 because the Chinese economy
suffered from an extremely volatile business cycle from 1953 to 1976. There are 3 main
phases during this period: 1953-1961, 1962-1967, 1968-1976. During the first phase,
from 1953 to 1961, the GDP growth increased 18.94% in one year; it soared from 3.92%
in 1957 to 22.34% in 1958. In 1961, the GDP growth rate dropped by -16.28% which was
38.62% lower than its peak. During the second business cycle, the highest point was
17.98%, which was 22.93% higher than the lowest point. In the third phase, there were 3
small cycles (1968-1972, 1972-1974, 1974-1976). Nearly every cycle during this period
lasted only two years. At this time, the market economy began to replace the planned
economy. Although the Chinese economy had not gotten rid of the planned economy
altogether, the market had become an increasingly important factor which affected the
state of the economy.
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Comparing the business cycles before and after Chinese economic reform, we find
some consistent changes in the business cycles after 1978:
First, the amplitude of business cycles was smaller and the fluctuation of the
economy was less volatile. The economy was much more stable than it was before the
economic reform.
President Deng Xiaoping pointed out during the economic reform that economic
development must be the most important strategy of China. Political movement was no
longer the crucial factor of economic fluctuation. Government took economic
development seriously and the Chinese economic environment became stable. In the
meantime, the effect of agriculture on business cycle was no longer as important as it was
before 1978. Business cycles before economic reform in China were more like
“agriculture cycles”. Before 1978, famine was one of the most serious problems in China.
The food supply was insufficient. Boom time usually happened in the years after a good
harvest. The Economy slumped after a poor harvest. Chinese agriculture developed
rapidly through economic reform. The food supply was no longer a serious problem after
1984. China’s agriculture development eliminated the agriculture factor from the list of
“factors that affect business cycles”. The reaction time by the government to the
economic movement was shorter and the policy that government implemented was better.
For example: in 1988, China suffered from severe inflation. The CPI reached 11.8%.
Government neither took action in time nor made an effort to guide people through the
inflation. Then the public began to doubt the ability of government to solve the economic
problem and panicked. People flooded the markets with panic purchase of necessities like

15

oil and salt, purchasing enough for a year. In order to control inflation, the Chinese
government arbitrarily increased interest rates. This immediately led the economy to
slump and caused a severe depression. But the situation was much better in 1993 and
2004. During the depression in the fourth business cycle, China successfully finished its
first “soft landing”. During the fourth business cycle, the CPI dropped from 24.1% to
8.3% but GDP maintained a very high growth rate. In 2004, the Chinese economy
became overheated. Through macro-control, government achieved the second “soft
landing”. During the fifth business cycle, inflation was moderate and the GDP growth
rate was under control.
Second, there is a high growth rate of GDP. The real estate and car industry were two
representative industries during the structural economic improvement through the
economic reform. The demand for durable goods increased due to the improvement of
per-capita GDP. Take real estate as an example; the development of real estate benefits
many industries, like cement, steel, chemical, coal and ore. All these correlated industries
become an integrated network and promote one another. The car industry is similar to the
real estate industry. Since 2002, China has sped up industrialization and urbanization.
The total demand for real estate and cars has increased dramatically. This improvement
of the economic structure and changes of demand led to a high growth rate of GDP to
some extent.
Although economic reform transformed the Chinese economy from a planned
economy to a market economy, business cycles in China have still been affected by
planning. The government is still the main factor that causes business cycles.
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The Chinese economy changed a lot through 30 years of economic reform. Most of
the commodity prices have opened and have become market oriented. Private enterprises
are experiencing a huge development. But the reform is not completed yet. The planned
economy is still playing a role in the new Chinese economy. For example: 1. State-owned
enterprises are still the main players in the market. Government is responsible for the
profits and losses of these state-owned enterprises. Because of that, state-owned
enterprises are less profit driven and comparatively inefficient. The whole market is not
efficient as we expect. 2. Government still controls a large part of the industry, especially
the financial industry. The main player is still the government. 3. The market mechanism
is still not complete. Regulations have not been well established.
Business cycles in China are still affected by the planned economy. More precisely,
Chinese business cycles are more like “government-induced business cycle”. Boom time
starts because the Chinese government artificially expands credit. Government increases
investment in order to develop the economy. This is not a market-oriented result. Huge
investment leads to an overheated economy. Development is unsustainable, similar to the
situation Roger Garrison mentioned in the book Capital-Based Macroeconomics. In order
to control the overheated economy and inflation, government tightens fiscal and
monetary policy to drag the economy back to normal status. When the economy goes
down, this process starts again. In China, political power still plays an important role in
economy. The duration of business cycles are highly correlated to changes in the
government.
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Fourth, Local government became one of the most important triggers of Chinese
business cycles
The first three business cycles were induced by the central government. China
started fiscal reform in the 1980s. The central government began its fiscal
decentralization reform to let the sub national governments have more power in financing
their needs and gradually build up their accountability. Local government had the right to
decide their own economic policy and were responsible for their own fiscal revenue.
Local economic development also became a very important criterion of the performance
of local government. This reform stimulated a huge local economic development but this
also led to contentions over capital between sub national governments and a fanaticism of
pursuing high investment. The trigger of business cycles shifted from central government
to local governments.
Some Factors Which Affect Business Cycles
There are lots of factors which affect Chinese business cycles. In this part, I focus on
four aspects: The changes to the economic system, investment, the change of economic
structure and foreign trade.
The Changes to the Economic System
The Reform of the Central Bank
Before 1978, there was only one bank- The People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The
PBOC was a government-owned bank. It served as both the central bank and a
commercial bank. Between 1950 and 1978, the PBOC controlled nearly 93% of the total
financial assets of the country and handled almost all financial transactions (Thomas G.
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Rawski, p509). In 1978, the PBOC was separated from the government and became a
autonomous entity. Over the same period, three state-owned banks- Bank of China,
Construction Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of China took over some of the
PBOC’s commercial business. Another state-owned bank - The Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China was established in 1984 to take over the rest of the
commercial transactions of the PBOC. In 1984, the PBOC was formally established as
the central bank of the People’s Republic of China. The central bank became a useful
policy tool of government that could affect the economy and business cycles.
Overinvestment led to an increase of material imports and a huge deficit. The CPI
increased to 9.3% in 1985. In order to control the inflation, government implemented
tightened monetary policy through the PBOC. The PBOC increased the requirement of
reserves and tightened the credit .The PBOC also depreciated the exchange rate of RMB
and increased the interest rate. Then the growth of industry, investment and prices
decreased in 1986. The PBOC also played an important role in dealing with high inflation
in 1988. Implementing countercyclical policy through the PBOC became one of the most
important tools of the government in adjusting the economy and stabilizing business
cycles.
The Development of Private Enterprises
Before economic reform, all enterprises in China were state-owned. Although stateowned enterprises still played an important role in the economy, private enterprises
increased rapidly after the introduction of the market economy. Private industrial
enterprises expanded with the decrease of state-owned enterprises’ output growth after
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1978. In 2006, the output of private industrial enterprises reached 4159.24 billion RMB
which was 18 times more than the output of state-owned industrial enterprises. The
market share of state-owned industrial enterprises dropped from 67.6% in 1978 to 5.3%
in 2006 (Huang Ze-Lin, 2008). One typical characteristic of state-owned enterprises is
that they do not need to worry about financial budgets or losses because the government
is responsible for their profits and losses. Under this kind of “soft budget constraint”, the
investment and consumption demand of the state-owned enterprises are neither
determined by their business performance nor their money stock. For example, if a stateowned enterprise suffers from serious loss due to their incompetent products, the
government will most likely give them financial support in order to avoid bankruptcy.
Even if a state-owned enterprise does not have money to invest in other fields or to
expand their output, the government will likely give them financial support. A “soft
budget constraint” can contradict the market economy mechanism and result in
inefficiencies and unfairness. Without the unlimited financial support of the government,
private enterprises find it difficult to survive in the market; especially, private enterprises
and state-owned enterprises compete with each other in lots of industries in China. With
unlimited support from the government, State owned enterprises have the advantage over
private enterprises. This unfair support from government to state-owned enterprises will
induce the loss of private enterprises’ market share or private enterprises’ bankruptcy.
Without the pressure of market competition, state-owned enterprises often lose
significant amounts of government income and increase the government’s fiscal burden.
These factors explain why the decrease of state-owned industrial enterprises improved
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the soft budget constraint of government. More importantly, the effect of state-owned
enterprises on economic fluctuation decreased. The reduction of state-owned enterprises’
share avoided the situation in which government would have to take steps to save these
state-owned enterprises. The economy became much more stable and fluctuation was less
volatile. Private companies are profit-driven and market-oriented. They have high
expanded potential and efficiency during the reform. They also have a very strong ability
to adjust to the market during recessions. They decrease the amplitude of the business
cycle to some extent as well. That is one of the reasons why the last two business cycles
in China after 1990 were less volatile than the first three.
Investment
Investment is highly correlated with change of GDP in China.

Figure 3 Fixed Investment and GDP growth Rate
According to the Figure 3 above, the fixed investment growth rate is highly
correlated with GDP growth rate. Fixed investment is an important trigger of GDP
expansion. The correlation coefficient between the growth rate of real investment and the
growth rate of real GNP reached 79.5% from 1979 to 1997. (Cui Youping, 2007)
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The fluctuation of investment, especially fixed investment, has largely affected
economic growth. During the five business cycles in China, fixed investment was always
the main factor which stimulated economic boom time. When fixed investment increased
in one industry, it would not only benefit that one industry but also the whole frontier and
related industry. Once investment increased, industries like cement and steel increased,
and then drove the development of other related industries. Likewise, when fixed
investment decreased, the economy would shrink to adjust to the lack of investment.
Investment also created job opportunities and increased income. Social demand was
stimulated and consumption increased. In order to satisfy the increase of social need,
enterprises increased investment again. The expansion continued until the resources
could not sustain it any longer.
In the first three business cycles most of the fixed investment was driven by stateowned enterprises because a large part of the Chinese economy was still planned. Most of
the investment came from the government. Private investment grew in the last two cycles.
Government implemented tight fiscal and monetary policy in 1988 because of a high CPI.
State-owned investment decreased at first. Then, private investment began to decrease in
1989. Private investment shrunk at a quicker rate than state-owned investment. Private
investment was much more sensitive to the market than the state-owned investment.
Once they saw the market going down they would halt investment immediately.
Government started to increase investment again in 1991. The growth rate of state-owned
investment was still 10% higher than the private investment growth rate. Until 1993,
private investment started to soar. The growth rate of private investment reached 72%.
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During the Asia financial crisis in 1997, government increased state-owned investment to
expand domestic demand. Unfortunately, few private investments followed because of
the down time. Huge state-owned investment try to stimulate the market again in 2002,
private investment followed and the growth rate started to rise again. Private investment
growth rate increased from 5.1% in 1999 to 46.4% in 2003. State-owned investment
acted as a market guide. Private investment felt safe entering the market with the guide of
state-owned investment.
Changes to economic structure
Changes to the Structure of Industry
China divides its economy into three parts: The primary industry is involved in the
extraction and collection of natural resources, including agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry and fishery, etc.; The secondary industry of an economy is dominated by the
manufacture of finished products.The secondary industry makes products that are more
likely to be consumed by individuals, such as the mining industry, manufacturing,
electricity, gas and water and architecture; The tertiary industry includes all industries
which do not belong to the primary or secondary industry categories. We can also define
the tertiary industry as an industry made up of companies that primarily earn revenue
through providing intangible products and services.Service industry companies are
involved in retail, transport, distribution, food services, as well as other servicedominated businesses. An optimal structure of economy can help economy stay in a
balanced status. In developed countries, such as the US and UK for example, the growth
rate and employment in primary industry has gradually decreased since the 1970s. The
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weight of output and employment in developed countries’ secondary industry was
increasing before the 1960’s but has since begun to decline. The relative weight of the
tertiary industry has increased in most developed countries since the 1960s. In most of
the developed countries, the weight of the third industry is now more than 60%. We can
conclude that during industrialization secondary industry increases and plays a major role
in economic development. But in the post-industrialization stage, tertiary industry will
grow and will accompany a decrease in secondary industry. Many criteria like income
elasticity, productivity, resource efficiency can help economic development by changing
the industry structure. With the development of the economy and industry structure, the
weight of the primary industry decreases and that of the tertiary industry increases. After
economic reform, the structure of the Chinese economy changed significantly. In
alignment with the conclusion, as we can see in the Figure 4, the weight of the primary
industry decreased significantly after 1978. The secondary industry fluctuated over the
past 30 years, but kept its weight between 40% and 50%. The tertiary industry grew
rapidly. The weight of the tertiary industry expanded from 21.63% in 1979 to 41.82% in
2008.
The
The
Primary

Secondary

Industry

Industry

(%)

(%)

Tertiar
Primary

Secondary

Industry

Industry

(%)

(%)

Tertiary
Year

y
Year

Industry

Industr

(%)

y
(%)

1978

28.19

47.88

23.94

1994
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19.86

46.57

33.57

1979

31.27

47.1

21.63

1995

19.96

47.18

32.86

1980

30.17

48.22

21.6

1996

19.69

47.54

32.77

1981

31.88

46.11

22.01

1997

18.29

47.54

34.17

1982

33.39

44.76

21.85

1998

17.56

46.21

36.23

1983

33.18

44.38

22.44

1999

16.47

45.76

37.77

1984

32.13

43.09

24.78

2000

15.06

45.92

39.02

1985

28.44

42.89

28.67

2001

14.39

45.15

40.46

1986

27.14

43.72

29.14

2002

13.74

44.79

41.47

1987

26.81

43.55

29.64

2003

12.8

45.97

41.23

1988

25.7

43.79

30.51

2004

13.39

46.22

40.38

1989

25.1

42.83

32.06

2005

12.12

47.37

40.51

1990

27.12

41.34

31.54

2006

11.11

47.95

40.94

1991

24.53

41.79

33.68

2007

10.77

47.34

41.89

1992

21.79

43.46

34.76

2008

10.73

47.45

41.82

1993

19.71

46.57

33.72

Table 4 Major Trends in Chinese Industry

Figure 4 Major Trends in Chinese Industry
At the beginning of the economic reform, primary industry accounted for 30% of all
GDP. In 2008, the primary industry had already dropped to 10.73% of total GDP. Then in
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the years following 1978, primary industry as a percentage of total GDP increased
because of the family contract responsibility system in the agriculture industry. Policy
induced the increase in agricultural productivity. Then the size of primary industry began
to decrease. Aside from the decreased importance of primary industry, the structure of
primary industry improved. Before economic reform, agriculture was the main part of
primary industry, accounted for more than 80% of the primary industry. The structure of
the primary industry became much more diversified after 1978.
Total Output
of Agriculture,
Animal
Forestry,

Forestry

Year

Agriculture (%)

Fisher
Husbandry

Animal

(%)

y (%)
(%)

husbandry and
Fishery
1978

139.7

80

3.4

15

1.6

1980

192.26

75.6

4.2

18.4

1.7

1985

361.95

69.2

5.2

22.1

3.5

1989

653.473

62.8

4.4

27.6

5.3

1990

766.21

64.7

4.3

25.7

5.4

1991

815.7

63.1

4.5

26.5

5.9

1992

908.47

61.5

4.7

27.1

6.8

1993

1099.55

60.1

4.6

27.4

8

1994

1575.05

58.2

3.9

29.7

8.2

1995

2034.09

58.4

3.5

29.7

8.4

1996

2235.37

60.6

3.5

26.9

9

1997

2378.84

58.2

3.4

28.7

9.6
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1998

2454.186

58

3.5

28.6

9.9

1999

2451.906

57.5

3.6

28.5

10.3

2000

2491.58

55.7

3.8

29.7

10.9

2001

2617.96

55.2

3.6

30.4

10.8

54.5

3.8

30.9

10.8

2739.075
2002
4
2003

2969.18

50.1

4.2

32.1

10.6

2004

3623.899

50.1

3.7

33.6

9.9

2005

3945.089

49.7

3.6

33.7

10.2

Table 5 Total Output of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery

Figure 5 Percentage of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry and Fishery in the
Primary Industry
As we can see in the Table 5 and Figure 5, the relative size of the agriculture
industry decreased; the percentage of the agriculture industry comprised of forestry
remained nearly the same; animal husbandry and fishery experienced a burgeoning
development. In 2005, animal husbandry as a percentage of total agriculture increased
from 15% in 1978 to 33.7% in 2005; the size of the fishing industry also increased from
1.6% in 1978 to 10.2% in 2005. This huge change was induced by the change in the
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consumption structure. According to the increase of income, the demand for diversity of
food stimulated the development of other primary industries. The diverse and balanced
development of primary industry evaded volatile fluctuation in primary industry through
the course of the business cycle.
During the process of industrialization, the growth of secondary industry drove the
growth of the growth of the economy. Furthermore, rapid expansion of secondary
industry was highly correlated with the change of its structure. From 1978 to 2005, the
output of secondary industry increased from 174.52 billion RMB to 8704.67 billion RMB.
The annual growth rate reached 11.3%. Secondary industry as a percentage of total
economic output stabilized around 40% to 50% (China: 30 years of reform and openingup, 2008). After economic reform, manufacturing as a percentage of secondary industry
was very stable. Technology-intensive industries developed rapidly which optimized the
structure of secondary industry. Secondary industry gradually changed from laborintensive and capital-intensive to technology-intensive. Industrial expansion also focused
on quality as a primary target instead of quantity. The size of the coal, textile, food and
manufacturing industries decreased significantly. Oil and gas extraction, oil refining
transportation equipment manufacturing and the manufacturing industry of electronic and
telecommunications equipment expanded very fast. The development of the
manufacturing industry of electronic and telecommunications equipment was especially
impressive. The proportion increased from 6.66% in 1985 to 10.16% in 2004.
The development of tertiary industry was one of the successes of the economic
reform. The expansion of tertiary industry was much higher than that of the other two
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industries. The average annual growth rate of tertiary industry was 10.7%, 1.1% higher
than the average annual growth rate of GDP. At the beginning of economic reform, the
tertiary industry was mainly constituted of financial institutions, restaurants,
transportation and other traditional services industries. Through a 20-year development,
other service industries, like tourism, consulting, banking, insurance, real estate,
education, also expanded quickly. The importance of traditional service industries
dropped while others, such as education, entertainment, public services, real estate and
public health, increased dramatically.
The Change to Consumption Structure
Improvement to employment, housing, education, and income changed the pattern
of consumption. The main part of the consumption became housing and transportation
instead of groceries, commodities and clothing. Before economic reform, China had a
serious constraint of personal credit- all personal expenses would have to be paid with
personal savings. With the development of the economy, the elasticity of consumption
demand for large durable consumer goods became very high. During the late 1970s to
early 1980s, the watch, bicycle, sewing machine, and radio industries expanded
dramatically. In the late 1980s, the increased demand for televisions, washing machines
and refrigerators stimulated a fast growth of light industry. After 2002, the auto and real
estate industries began to develop. From 2002 to 2004, the average growth rate of the real
estate industry increased to 10.7%. The growth rate of the auto industry reached 89.7% in
2003(Report of Research on Chinese Economic Cycles, p10). The change in the
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consumption structure was the result of industrialization, urbanization and economic
development.
The Widening Gap Between The Rich and The Poor
By setting up a model, Yin Heng, Gong Liutang and Zhou Hengfu found out, if the
beginning status of the economy is a comparatively less developed equalitarianism,
implementation of “encourage some people to become rich sooner than others” policy
can accelerate economic growth. But, with the development of economy, increased
income distribution inequality then starts to dampen the economic growth (Yin Heng,
Gong Liutang and Zhou Hengfu, 2005, “Income inequality and economic growth: back to
Kuznets’ assumption” ). Before economic reform, income distribution in China was
comparatively equal due to the planned economy. During the reform, the government
chose to let some people and regions prosper before others in the hope that they would
carry the backward regions. The speed of economic growth increased tremendously. And
with the high economic growth rate, the inequality of income distribution became severe.
According to the Report of Research on Chinese Economic Cycles, the Gini coefficient
was 0.30 in the early 1980s and reached 0.33 in the late 1980s. The Gini coefficient
became 0.434 in 1994 and increased to 0.458 in 2000. In 2008, the Gini coefficient was
0.65. Unfortunately, the gap between the rich and poor had been widened. According to
2006 data, the income of the lowest 10% population was equal to one ninth of the income
of the highest 10% population in the urban area. In China, the majority of consumers are
from the middle and low income groups. Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social
Circumstance in 2008 pointed out that although the consumption of the high income
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group is around 1.96 times higher than the national average, this consumption is mainly
focused on luxury goods. Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social Circumstance in 2008
also pointed out that although the middle class had high demand potential, they did not
have the buying power to match. The percentage of middle class consumer spending as a
percentage of total consumption continued to decrease. All this suggests the consumption
of the middle class will significantly affects social demand, which will further affect
economic growth. Since the fluctuation of China’s business cycle is a reflection of
economic growth, the inequality of income distribution is a crucial factor in business
cycle fluctuations.
Foreign Trade
During economic reform, Deng Xiaoping committed China to adopt policies that
promote foreign trade and economic investment. This “open door” policy linked the
Chinese economy with the international economy. Before economic reform, foreign trade
was not a significant part of the Chinese economy. From 1953 to 1978, the total volume
of foreign trade increased from 2.37 billion dollar to 20.64 billion dollar, but Chinese
foreign trade as a percentage of GDP dropped from 1.23% to 0.75%. Foreign trade was
overlooked before economic reform. The Chinese government implemented policies to
stimulate foreign trade after 1978. The growth of foreign trade was higher than the
growth of GDP. Chinese foreign trade rose in the international rankings from 32nd in
1978 to 3rd in 2008. The total volume of foreign trade in 2008 reached 2561.6 billion
dollars.
Year

Foreign Trade

Export

31

Import

Ranking

Weight

Ranking

Weight

Ranking

Weight

1981

22

1.1

19

1.1

21

1.1

1982

20

1.1

17

1.2

22

1

1983

20

1.2

17

1.2

18

1.1

1984

16

1.4

18

1.4

17

1.4

1985

11

1.8

17

1.4

11

2.1

1986

12

1.7

16

1.5

11

2

1987

17

1.6

16

1.6

14

1.7

1988

15

1.8

16

1.7

14

1.9

1989

15

1.8

14

1.7

14

1.9

1990

16

1.7

15

1.8

18

1.5

1991

15

2

13

2.1

15

1.8

1992

11

2.2

11

2.3

13

2.1

1993

11

2.7

11

2.5

11

2.8

1994

11

2.9

11

2.9

11

2.8

1995

11

2.9

11

3

12

2.7

1996

11

3

11

2.9

12

2.6

1997

10

2.9

10

3.3

12

2.5

1998

11

3

9

3.4

11

2.5

1999

9

3.2

9

3.5

11

2.8

2000

7

3.6

7

3.9

8

3.4

2001

6

4

6

4.3

6

3.8

2002

5

4.7

5

5.1

6

4.4

2003

4

5.6

4

5.9

3

5.3

2004

3

6.2

3

6.5

3

5.9

2005

3

6.7

3

7.3

3

6.1
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2006

3

7.4

3

8

3

6.4

2007

3

7.7

2

8.8

3

6.7

2008

3

8

2

9.4

3

7

Table 6 Foreign Trade, Exports and Imports
According to Table 6, the speed of development in foreign trade was tremendous.
During 1978 to 2008, the average annual growth rate of foreign trade was around 19%,
nearly two times more than the average growth rate of global international trade. Chinese
foreign trade increased 124 times in 30 years.
A lengthy debate exists about the causative relations between the GDP growth rate
and changes in foreign trade: whether economic growth becomes a trigger of foreign
trade or an increase of foreign trade stimulates the economic growth. All these viewpoints
have the assumption that foreign trade and economic growth affect each other.
JustinYifuLin and Yongjun Li conclude in “A Re-Examination of International Trade’s
Contribution to China’s Economic Growth” that in the 1990s a near 10% increase in
export led to a 1% increase in Chinese GDP. This multiplier was lower in the 1980s,
likely because the relative weight of exports was too small. This number was stabilized at
around 20% in late 1990s.
Growth
Growth Rate

GDP

GDP
Rate of

of Foreign

Growth

Growth

Year

Year
Trade

Foreign

Rate

Rate
Trade

(%)

(%)

(%)
(%)

1978

39.4

11.7

1994

10.91

13.1

1979

42.1

7.6

1995

18.7

10.9
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1980

28.95

7.8

1996

3.21

10

1981

16.39

5.2

1997

12.17

9.3

1982

-5.43

9.1

1998

-0.37

7.8

1983

4.78

10.9

1999

11.3

7.6

1984

22.76

15.2

2000

31.5

8.4

1985

29.99

13.5

2001

7.46

8.3

1986

6.09

8.8

2002

21.78

9.1

1987

11.92

11.6

2003

37.1

10

1988

24.37

11.3

2004

35.7

10.1

1989

8.66

4.1

2005

23.2

9.9

1990

3.36

3.8

2006

22.38

11.6

1991

17.49

9.2

2007

23.5

11.9

1992

22.05

14.2

2008

17.8

9

1993

18.23

14

Table 7 The Foreign Trade and the GDP

Figure 6 The Foreign Trade and the GDP
As we can see in Table 7 and Figure 6, the peak of foreign trade was reached in
1984, 1987, 1992 and 2004. During these years, Chinese GDP also had a very high
growth rate. On the contrary, when the foreign trade growth rate decreased because of
economic crisis, the GDP growth rate also dropped significantly. For example, during the
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economic crisis in 1982, the Chinese foreign trade growth rate decreased from 16.39% in
1981 to -5.43% in 1982. The GDP growth rate in 1981 was only 5.2%. As a result of the
Asian financial crisis, foreign trade decreased by -0.37% in 1998. Economy suffered
from insufficient domestic demand because of the economic downturn. A decrease in
foreign trade made the situation worse. The GDP growth rate dropped to 7.8% in 1998
and decreased to 7.6% in 1999. GDP growth is highly correlated with changes in the
level of foreign trade.
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF MONETARY
POLICY IN CHINA
The efficiency of monetary policy is largely determined by the institutional
backgrounds and conditions of the country. As Yanfen Huang mentioned in The Money
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, the necessary institutional preconditions
for a successful conduct of monetary policy include: (1) Establishing an autonomous
central bank, which is a prerequisite for creating the central bank’s credibility. (2) Having
a well-functioning, market-based banking system. (3) Developing an efficient financial
market. During the 30 years after economic reform, China’s financial system has been
changed from a monobank system to a two-tier banking system. Government
implemented policies to cultivate and develop the financial market. In the meantime,
government also introduced indirect control mechanisms into the monetary policies.
The Banking System before Economic Reform
Before economic reform, China’s banking system was a monobank system. The
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) had a monopoly on currency issuance, transaction
clearing, saving collection and lending for working capital investment. PBOC acted both
as a central bank and as a commercial bank. Before 1978, the PBOC controlled about
93% of all financial assets of China (Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005).
The specialized banks—the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) and the Bank
of China (BOC) were the special departments of the PBOC. During the pre-reform period,
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enterprises received investment and construction funds in the form of budgetary grants.
Bank lending was only related to the enterprises’ transitory working capital. The main
role of the PBOC was that of a cashier for the Ministry of Finance. The conventional
view of the bank’s role in China in pre-1978 was merely that of a passive or
accommodating instrument of central planning (Leroy Jin, Monetary Policy and the
Design of Financial Institutions in China, 1978-90). There was another important
haracteristic of China’s financial system in the pre-reform period – two separate
monetary circuits. The currency circuit referred to the transactions of consumption and
wage payments for the non-state sector; the bank transfer circuit was used to clear
transactions related to production and investment activities among enterprises and
institutions. There were strict regulatory barriers between these two circuits before
economic reform. Before 1978, residents both in the urban and rural area could only use
cash for payment; enterprises could not withdraw cash from their bank accounts unless
they obtained approval from the PBOC. Under this financial background, monetary
authority could easily use a “cash plan” to control the currency flow and implement the
“credit plan” to manage the bank transfer circuit.
The Three Stages of the Financial Sector Reform
The First Phase of the Banking System Reform 1978-1984
Since economic reform, greater emphasis has been placed on the role of banks and
monetary policy. The financial sector has been considerably reformed. Banks have
become specialized and diversified.
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During the first period, the PBOC continued to control the majority of commercial
activities. The most significant progress in the banking system during the economic
reform was the abolishment of the monobank in China. During 1979-1984, the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Capitalize
Bank of China (PCBC) and the China International Thrust and Investment Corporation
(CITIC) were established. Different banks had different functions: The ABC was
responsible was responsible for the agriculture and rural economy. It guided and
controlled Rural Credit Cooperatives. The BOC provided services to foreign exchange
related banking business. The PCBC specialized in monitoring state budget, financed
investment, and was also engaged in general banking business. The CITIC’s task was to
attract foreign capital and advanced technologies to China. In 1979, the government
decided that bank loans should gradually replace budgetary grants as the main financing
sources of investment. All of the investment funds for enterprises’ were no longer granted
by the state budget.
In addition, just like in the real sector, China’s state specialized banks adopted a
system of profit retention in 1983(Zhou Zhengqing, Research on the Monetary Policy in
China, 1993). After paying business tax, banks could keep a specific proportion of the
profits to develop business and to fund employee welfare. Because of this policy, state
specialized banks became profit-driven.
The Creation of a Two-Tier Banking System: 1984-1994
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was established in 1984 to
assume the remaining commercial lending activities of the PBOC. The PBOC became the
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central bank of China in 1984. A two-tier banking system in China took shape. The
Banking system became more diverse. Four nation-wide commercial banks (ABC, ICBC,
BOC, and CBC) were permitted to compete with state-owned specialized banks in all
banking business. In order to meet local funding needs, some regional development banks
were established during this period. The non-bank financial institutions also expanded.
Urban credit cooperatives expanded to serve small individually or collectively owned
enterprises in urban areas. Trust and investment companies also developed very quickly.
Most of these trust and investment companies were founded by local governments and
the four state banks. In 1998, many trust and investment companies merged with state
banks. Other non-bank financial institutions, such as leasing companies, security
companies and insurance companies also emerged during this period.
The Transition toward a Market-Oriented Financial System
A strategy arose from the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee
in 1993: establishing a structure conducive to the operation of a socialist market economy.
This policy clearly pointed out the direction of future economic development:
transformation of the BPOC into a modern central bank responsible for monetary policy
and supervision of the financial system, separation of policy lending from commercial
lending, gradual transformation of specialized banks into commercial banks and
modernization of the infrastructure of the financial sector (Yanfen Huang, The Money
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, P13).
Memorandum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 14 November
1993
As the central bank, the People’s Bank of China shall conduct monetary policy
independently.
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The Central bank of China shall be under the leadership of the State Council.
The people’s Bank of China shall manage the money supply and stabilize the
currency value, by changing from relying mainly on control over the credit quota
to the reserve ratio control.
The People’s Bank of China shall supervise all other financial institutions.
The People’s Bank of China will not conduct business with non-financial
institutions.
The banking business and the securities business shall be separated.
A committee shall be formed to conduct monetary policy.
The commercial banks shall engage in the management of assets, liabilities and
risks.
According to the situation of monetary supply and demand, the central bank shall
make timely adjustments to the benchmark rates.
The interest rates of the deposits and loans in the commercial banks can be freely
floated within a certain range given by the PBOC.
The memorandum pointed out that the PBOC obtained official permission from the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to become independent in conducting
monetary policy. As we can see, the financial supervision function of the PBOC was
emphasized in the memorandum. The legal right of the PBOC to formulate and
implement monetary policy has also been emphasized in the Central Bank Law (the
PBOC law) which was approved in 1995. The PBOC law mentioned that in order to
stabilize the value of the currency and promote the growth of the economy, the PBOC
should gradually use more indirect methods to control the money supply such as market
based operations, discount rate adjustment, reserve ratio and providing loans to banks
(Article 22). The application of the mandatory credit plan shall be gradually reduced or
abolished. The PBOC law also mentioned that the government shall sell bonds to finance
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its deficit instead of pushing the central bank to issue currency. Under the instruction of
the PBOC law, the following financial reforms were carried out (Yanfen Huang, The
Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China):
1. From 1994 on, the PBOC was no longer responsible for financing budget
deficits.
2. In order to reduce the intervention of local government during monetary policy
implementation in 1998,the PBOC reconstructed its organization. Local branches
were replaced by nine interregional main branches which operate across
provincial lines.
3. As of January 1, 1998 the credit-quotas of the state banks were abolished.
Then the Commercial Bank Law (the CB Law) was enacted on May 1st, 1995. The
CB Law tried to guide the large domestic banks through a transform into independent
commercial entities. According to the CB law, commercial banks shall operate
independently and take responsibility for their own profits and losses. Government also
implemented some policies to cooperate with the CB law. Three policy banks—The
Import and Export Bank of China, the State Development Bank of China and The
Agricultural Development Bank were founded to help state banks reduce policy-based
lending. The Government also shut down some financial institutions that had incurred
losses. State banks started to issue special treasury bonds to raise the capital adequacy
ratio in order to write-off bad debts. Government also developed a competitive banking
system: Co-operative banks started to expand after1995. In the meantime, the first private
banking institution-Minsheng Bank was established in 1995.
The Structure of Chinese Banking System
During the 30 year development after economic reform, the diversity of the financial
sector has been improved.
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Business Scope or Operational
Type

Ownership

Independence

Law

• Formulating and implementing
monetary policies

The

• Exercising supervision and

The PBC

bank: the

administration of the financial sector

law

PPBC

• Non-independence , under the

central
State-owned

leadership of the State Council
State-

• Performing deposit money bank

owned

business

The CB

commerci

• Subject to the intervention of

law

al banks

government

State-owned

• Provision of policy loans
• Their financing is secured by capital
and other contributions from the
government, financial bond
Policy
State-owned placements with state commercial
banks
banks and borrowing from the
international financial markets
• Subject to the intervention of
government
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none

Indirectly
state-owned
except
Minsheng
Bank.
Normally

• Performing deposit money bank

Other

they are

business

commerci

joint-stock

• Less subject to the intervention of

The CB
law
al banks

banks, but

government than state-owned

their main

commercial banks

shareholder
s are
government
agencies or
SOEs
Non-bank
financial
institution
s:
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Initially
owned by
the local
government
Trust and
and the
• Engaging in a wide scope of business

Investmen
state-owned

• Subject to the intervention of local

t

none

commercial
governments

Companie
banks. Now
s
they have
various
types of
ownership.
Rural and
urban

• Performing deposit money bank

credit

business and extending loans normally

cooperativ

The CB

Collectively
to collective enterprises

es

law

-owned
including

• Subject to the intervention of the

urban

municipal and county governments

cooperativ
e banks
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Financial

Various,

Engaging in intra-industry financing

normally

and other financial activities, like
none

companies

owned by

leasing, acceptances, bill discounting

SOEs

and credit guarantees

Various,
Engaging in financing the imports of

Financial
normally

capital goods and equipment for

leasing

none

owned by
export-oriented enterprises

companies
SOEs

Table 8 The Institutions of China’s Banking Sector
According to Table 8, there are 9 types of financial institutions in China’s banking
system. Compare to the pre-reform period, the diversity of the banking system had
improved significantly. But banking system legislation is still not complete.
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Figure 7 The Structure of the China’s Financial Sector
The Problems of China’s Banking System
Lack of Independence of the PBOC and Poor Banking Supervision
The condition of the central bank’s independence is a very important criterion of
monetary policy efficiency. The independence of the central bank can firstly avoid
political pressures to some extent. Pursuing political achievements, such as economic
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growth and a low employment rate is one of the most important tasks for politicians
during their terms. In order to highlight political achievements, governors like to see fast
economic growth, which had already been a main target after China’s economic reform.
If a central bank is under strict control by the government, like McDonough mentioned, it
is inevitable “to be tempted to promote easy credit policies”( McDonough: The
Importance of Central Bank Independence in Achieving Price Stability). Central banks
have to issue more money and implement policies to help government expend total social
needs in order to stimulate economic growth and lower the unemployment rate. Growth
like this is short-term and will induce inflation. Lack of independence then weakens the
efficiency of monetary policy. Even worse, the central bank probably needs to finance
government budget deficits directly which has happened in China. The policies that the
central bank implemented might relieve problems such as difficulties in financing
government budget deficits or reducing unemployment in the short-term but may
ultimately result in severe problems like high inflation and the need for severe credittightening later on. Also, according to Grilli (Grilli et al.1991), there were two aspects to
judge a central bank’s independence: economic independence and political independence.
Economic independence can guarantee the right of the central bank to choose the suitable
instrument to pursue the final goal of monetary policy. Grilli (Grilli et al.1991) pointed
out that economic independence was mainly determined by: (1) whether the government
can determine how much to borrow from the central bank. (2) whether the central bank
controls monetary policy instruments (Grilli et al., 1991, p366-368). Political
independence refers to the capacity of the central bank to choose the final goal of
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monetary policy. As Grilli mentioned, political independence is determined by: (1)
whether the governing authority of the central bank is under the control of the
government. (2) whether government approval is needed before monetary policy
implementation. (3) whether price stability is explicitly stated in the central bank law.
As we can see in Figure 7, the PBOC was led by the State Council as a government
administrative organization before 1995 (Bank Regulations-1986). Apparently, the PBOC
was not politically independent: The governor of the PBOC was appointed by the
government; monetary policy decisions needed to be approved by the central government
before implementation; The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank
of China stated that there were two equally weighted objectives for the PBOC’s monetary
policy: development of the economy and currency stability. The PBOC didn’t have much
economic independence either. First, the PBOC was required to finance the government
budget deficits. As a government organization, the PBOC branches covered all provinces,
cities and counties. Local government intervened in the operation of local PBOC
branches to ensure that they were cooperating with economic development plans. Local
branches were governed by both the PBOC’s headquarters and local government. This
system made the PBOC vulnerable to government interference.
The PBOC gained some independence after 1995.The enactment of the PBOC law
in 1995 stated that the PBOC was forbidden from providing credit to the government; the
intervention by local government was phased out. Price stability became the primary
objective of monetary policy. But unfortunately, it was still very difficult for the PBOC to
maintain independence under the PBOC Law. The PBOC was still led by the State
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Council. The governor was still appointed by the State Council. Although price stability
has become the main target of monetary policy, the PBOC could not refuse requests by
government, such as rescuing state-owned enterprises and maintaining political and
social stability. Moreover, the objective of monetary policy was still subordinated to the
government’s economic development target. Monetary policy decision still had to be
approved by the State Council as before.
The banking supervision system is still underdeveloped in China. Although banking
supervision has been improved since 1978, it is still insufficient. First, as mentioned
earlier, the PBOC still lacks independence; its supervision is subject to the intervention of
government agencies. Also, the banking law system is still incomplete. As we can see in
Table 8, there are no specific laws that govern policy banks, trust and investment
companies, financial companies and financial leasing companies.
Obligations to the SOEs
During the reform period, the allocation of investment funds shifted gradually from
non-repayable budgetary grants to interest-bearing bank loans (2.2.1). Because of this
reform, the banking institutions were obligated to support the SOEs. This brought about
serious moral hazard in the banking system. The bank was obliged to provide loans to the
SOEs regardless of their capacities of repayment. Banks neither had the ability nor
incentive to select borrowers. Moreover, compared to developed countries, the
accounting and auditing system in China was still not well established. Banks would like
to monitor their borrowers, but they could not get enough information. SOEs also had the
privilege to low-cost credit because most banks wanted to loan to them. As I mentioned
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earlier, SOEs had little concern for interest rate and investment risk because of the “soft
budget” constraint. Although state-owned enterprises were also vested with a financial
interest in maximizing profit, those that incurred losses could not be subject to
bankruptcy. No matter how much they lost, they were always bailed out with financial
subsidies or other instruments. SOE could still survive even after chronic losses. This
“soft budget constraint” mechanism was the main factor that led to the low efficiency.
Consequently, financial losses increased year by year due to the SOEs’ inability to repay.
In order to rescue these SOEs, banks were required to provide the same businesses new
loans. The situation deteriorated. Large non-performing loans worsened the profitability
of state banks.
The government was caught in a dilemma. As Yanfen Huang pointed out in the The
Monetary Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, refusing loans to loss-making
enterprises would cause widespread bankruptcies and unemployment, which would cause
political and social problems. However, continuing to provide loans to them would wreck
financial reform (Yanfen Huang, the Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in
China). Bankruptcies of these SOEs would surely increase the unemployment rate. In the
meantime, some enterprises might also be hurt due to the decrease of aggregate demand.
This can happen very fast. However, from a long-term point of view, even though bailing
out these inefficient poor-performing SOEs may prevent widespread bankruptcies and
unemployment, it can damage long-term economic performance. This also affects the
ability of monetary policy to make a better trade-off between unemployment and inflation.
If monetary policy only considers the one problem instead of making a trade-off between
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the two, easily cause the other under such conditions. Once this situation happens, it
affects the fluctuation of the economy, making cyclical ups and downs more volatile.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MONETARY POLICY
Until 2008, China’s economy had experienced five business cycles. The
fluctuation of these business cycles was highly related to China’s economic policy.
During the 30 years period after economic reform, China’s monetary policy gradually
transformed from a direct credit control pattern to indirect control. The instruments of
monetary policy were also improved.
Credit Plan
Brief Introduction of Credit Plan Evolution
Although the credit plan was gradually phased out, it played an important role in
China’s monetary policy history. The credit plan had a significant effect on the first two
business cycles after economic reform. Before economic reform, monetary policy was
implemented through the credit plan and the cash plan. The credit plan specified the
amount of credit needed by enterprises. At that time, monetary policy was only a passive
instrument to help the government achieve its objective. After economic reform, the
credit plan was still the main policy instrument. Instead of simply specifying the amount
of credit needed to support government’s goal (before economic reform), the credit plan
began to take the inflation and real GDP growth into account. The most important change
happened in 1985. Owing to the establishment of the central banking system, the credit
plan gradually transformed from a direct policy instrument to an indirect policy
instrument. After 1985, the PBOC was responsible for the overall credit quota of
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financial institutions. This overall credit plan was a goal of the country’s credit operation
and was passed to the headquarters of the state banks from the PBOC. According to the
overall credit plan, the PBOC would give the state banks specific credit quotas. State
banks could continue providing loans until the new loans reached the quotas. After
implementation of the PBOC law in 1995, government planned to abolish the credit plan
system. Then the credit plan was replaced by the guidance plan in 1998. Unlike the credit
plan, the guidance plan was only a reference for the loan-decisions of the state banks. The
PBOC could persuade the state banks to follow the guidance plan on lending but could
not force them to implement it. After this reform, the credit plan was transferred to the
“moral persuasion” or “window guidance” and was no longer the main instrument of
monetary policy.
As a direct control instrument of monetary policy, the credit plan was not an
efficient monetary policy choice. China executed the credit plan for a considerable
amount of time because of the economy’s unique state. First, China was short of capital
needed to pursue high economic growth after economic reform. Through the credit plan,
the PBOC could easily govern the money supply process and guide the capital flow to
high priority sectors through the banking system. In the meantime, because of the
decentralization process, investment funds which came from budgetary grants declined
due to the deterioration of the central government’s budget. The credit plan then became
an instrument to channel subsidies to the SOEs in order to make up the decline of
investment funds.

53

The implementation of the credit plan included two steps. The first step was a topto-bottom process. Taking into account the planned growth in output and investment, the
expected price level and the velocity of money, the PBOC figured out an overall credit
plan draft which included the size and amount of new loans and the share of total credit
that would be distributed among the state banks. Then, the PBOC transmitted the credit
plan draft to the headquarters of state banks. The headquarters of state banks then passed
the draft quota and deposit targets to their provincial and regional branches. Then the
bottom-up process began. The local branches of the state banks would develop their own
deposit target and credit plan dependent on the local funds and development needs and
would then pass these on to local branches of the PBOC. Provincial branches of the
PBOC would summarize the deposit and credit plan of local state bank branches and
develop provincial plans. Provincial plans would be submitted to the headquarters of the
PBOC. Based on these provincial plans, the PBOC would revise the initial credit plan and
submit the final draft to the State Council for final approval. After the final credit plan
was decided, the PBOC set final quotas for the headquarters of state banks, which then
set quotas for their local branches. As mentioned, state banks could continue to provide
loans until the new loans reached the quotas. When the local branches of the state banks
did not run out their quotas but did not have enough deposits (funds) to make loans, they
could borrow from the PBOC. This was a motivation for banks to attain higher quotas.
Actual
Planned target
Year

volume(b)(billion
(a)(billion Yuan)
Yuan)
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(b)/(a)

1990

170

275.7

1.622

1991

210

287.8

1.37

1992

283

352.6

1.246

1993

380

482.6

1.275

1994

470

607.5

1.293

1995

570

691.5

1.213

1996

650

793.8

1.221

Table 9 The Efficiency of the Credit Plan
(Source: HangshengXie (1997), P.5)
As we can see in Table 9, there were huge discrepancies between planned targets
and actual volume. According to the data, the credit plan was poorly implemented. Many
economists argued the credit plan was, in fact, ineffective. Local branches of the central
bank needed to cooperate with local authorities. The ambition of local government
induced significant investment demand. Meanwhile, the soft constraint was also
responsible for this huge gap. The World Bank (1995, p.52-54) proved that during the
upswing, the credit plan ceased to be binding on domestic credit and loan expansion.
Contrary to what we expected, the central bank’s money supply decision seemed not to
have stabilized the economy. The fact was, the credit plans induced economic fluctuation.
In the boom time, the credit plan failed to control the expansion of domestic credit. As
Jun Ma mentioned, “During all periods of economic overheating, the credit and cash
issuance plans were not strictly adhered to and were repeatedly revised upwards by
substantial margins” (Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China,
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p101). A high inflation rate and policy instability emerged because of the ineffectiveness
of the credit plan. Then central authority launched an austerity policy immediately to
sharply reduce credit when the inflation rate was too high. Because of the policy, credit
was reduced tremendously and artificially. The economy suddenly entered a recession.
Once the economy had been cooled down, the central authority then loosened its control
and the credit growth rate would bounce back. This type of “stop-and-go” cycle
characterized the PBOC’s monetary policy during the early stage of economic reform. It
was also the main factor that caused the high volatility of the first two business cycles
after economic reform.
The credit plan performed very well before economic reform. As the marketoriented economic reform proceeded, the banking system changed dramatically. The
credit plan was finally phased out because of its ineffectiveness and mismatch to the
reformed economic system. The efficiency of the credit plan was weakened by several
reasons:
First, the most significant change after economic reform in the financial system was
decentralization. As I mentioned previously, local branches of the PBOC were under
control of the “dual leadership”. Local branches of the PBOC were led by both the head
office of the PBOC and local government. Meanwhile, local branches of the PBOC
enjoyed discretionary authority over a part of the PBOC’s annual lending to the banking
institutions (The Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China,Yanfen Huang,
p86). Because of decentralization, the PBOC was not able to draw up a precise credit
plan on the basis of the credit needs. As mentioned before, the implementation of the
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credit plan included “top-to-bottom” and”bottom-to-top” procedures. Local government
strived for a larger share of bank credit because of the decentralization. Local branches of
the PBOC would want to cooperate with local government authority because of the dual
leadership. The result was, as the World Bank explained, much more a bottom-up
exercise than a top-down one (World Bank, 1995, p43). Working with the local bank
branches, local government found many ways to exaggerate their credit needs during the
bottom-up procedure in order to get a high credit quota. The credit quota was set lower
than the credit needs due to the PBOC’s awareness of this behavior. The credit gap
always existed between the credit plan and practical credit demands. The gap referred to
the amount of bank loans which was considered to be necessary but not included in the
credit plan. Thus, credit quotas would inevitably be exceeded. During the implementation
of the credit plan, the PBOC was always forced to adjust the credit quota upward because
of the huge pressure of credit demand. This eroded the credibility of the credit plan and
made the credit plan impracticable. The credit plan was likely more of a monetary game
between local state bank branches which represented the interests of the local authority
and the PBOC. There was also a discrepancy in objectives between the local state
branches and the PBOC. Given a specific credit quota, the local state bank branches
would prefer high yield investment projects. On the contrary, the PBOC favored essential
projects such as those in the agriculture and infrastructure sectors which local state banks.
The PBOC had the flexibility to revise the credit quotas ex post. Thus, when the PBOC
observed the under-investment in essential projects by the local state branches, it had to
provide additional credit to the essential projects to finance their need. This also drew up

57

the credit quotas. Furthermore, the local branch of the PBOC had the authority to provide
loans to banking institutions. Local branches were under pressure from local governments
to make up the credit quota which was beyond the planned quotas.
Another cause of the inefficiency of the credit plan was the diversification of the
banking system after economic reform. Many nationwide and regional commercial banks
and non-banks financial institutions grew rapidly. The increasing diversity of the banking
system caused the decline of the four state-owned banks’ share of the financial system.
This means that even if the PBOC were able to implement the plan, it was difficult for the
PBOC to monitor and control how the banking institutions used these funds, and thus the
total money supply. Also, poor banking supervision system gave banking institutions
channels to circumvent the credit plan. For example, banking institutions transferred
funds to non-banking financial institutions because these institutions were outside of the
jurisdiction of the credit plan and were subject to less strict regulation.
One target of the initial design of the credit plan was redistribution of funds. Usually,
deposits would exceed the credit quota in high-income regions. On the contrary, deposits
could not finance the credit quota in most low-income regions. The PBOC expected that
the high-income regions would transfer surplus funds to the PBOC in the form of excess
reserves. Then the PBOC could transfer these excess reserves to low-income regions.
However in practice, regions with surplus funds were not willing to transfer anything to
the PBOC. Regions with surplus funds would bargain for higher credit quotas more
actively because of their high deposits while banks in low-income regions usually had
difficulties in absorbing enough deposits to finance the assigned quotas. Hence the PBOC
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finally had to provide additional funds to finance this gap between deposits and the credit
quota.

Interest Rate Policy
Brief Review of Interest Rate Policy History
Interest rate policy before 1978
The interest rate is an important policy instrument of the Chinese government.
Before 1978, the interest rate was controlled completely by the central government
because of the highly centralized financial system. During the early stage after the
establishment of People’s Republic of China the economy was in a severe situation
because of the instability of the communist regime. The PBOC encountered many
problems; namely, financing the war expenses and rescuing the poor economy. In order
to control high inflation and help the ailing economy, China implemented a high interest
rate policy. According to the data, the interest rate on six-month fixed deposits reached
150% and the interest on saving deposits also soared to 30%-60% in May 1949. The
lending rate to private business reached 90%-210%. The interest rate was higher than the
inflation rate during this period. The policy intended to raise interest rate helped the
PBOC absorb significant funds and prevented hoarding and speculation. The price level
was comparatively stable in the early 1950s. The PBOC adjusted the interest rate level
based on the inflation rate and the profit rate of different industries. Until June 1952, the
one-month fixed deposit rate dropped to 7.5% and the one-year fixed deposit rate was
only 12%. There were two policy principles during the period: first, different policies
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were implemented by the PBOC between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises;
second, interest rate policy needed to connect to the market. Low interest rate policy was
executed since 1953 in order to stimulate investment and finance economic construction.
The lending rate of state-owned industry per month was only 0.45% and the lending rate
of state-owned business per month dropped to 0.69%. The interest rate of other industries
(both state-owned and private) also decreased dramatically. In 1955, interest rates began
to fall.
During the period 1958 - 1976, interest rate policy was ignored because of its
potential to mislead political power. From 1958 to 1978, the interest rate was frozen and
far below equilibrium levels because interest rates were regarded as a symbol of
exploitation by capitalists according to Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value (Yi, Gang,
Money, Banking and Financial Markets in China, 1994, p.78). In the meantime, the
interest rate structure had been oversimplified. Under political pressure, various types of
interest rate had been eliminated. There were only four rates for bank deposits and seven
bank lending rates in 1978 (Zhou, Zhengqing, research on the monetary policy in
China,1993.p.224). Government artificially set all different lending rates at 6%. The
interest rate structure, which was well established during the period 1949 – 1958, was
abandoned entirely after 1958.
Interest Rate Policy between 1978-1985
After 1978, authorities realized the important role that interest rate can play in
economic development. During this period interest rate policy was considered to be an
effective instrument of monetary policy once again. The government began to reset the
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overly low interest rate to a reasonable level in order to absorb funds. From 1979 to 1985,
the PBOC adjusted the deposit interest rate five times: China’s economy began to recover
after the cultural Revolution. In order to develop and stabilize the economy, the PBOC
increased the deposit rate in 1979.4, 1980.4, and 1982.4 to finance the economic
construction demand. The main purpose of the last two interest rate increases in 1985
(1985.4 and 1985.8) was to protect depositors against severe price level increases.
Meanwhile, interest rates were diversified. Banks began to provide three-year, five-year
and eight-year deposit rates. The PBOC had the authority to adjust interest rates but any
major adjustment had to be reported to the State Council. Changing interest rates by any
local branches of state banks or local branches of the PBOC was forbidden. This kind of
highly centralized interest rate policy was too strict and sometimes impractical. In order
to get a more effective interest rate system, the State Council authorized the PBOC a 20%
floating range of interest rate adjustment ( The Interest Rate Policy in the Economic
Development, Wenping, Wang, p.154). This was an important point of progress in
China’s monetary policy history. After being granted the 20% margin on interest rate
adjustment, the PBOC then permitted banks some interest rate adjustment quota. This
decentralization policy gave local banks rights to adjust the interest rate within a specific
range based on the different local economic situation.
Interest Rate after 1986
Interest rate policy after 1986 had a distinct feature: the interest rate was highly
compatible with economic fluctuation. Interest rates started to increase in 1985 in order to
fight against the high price level. The economy kept growing quickly after 1985 and
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inflation was out of control. The PBOC then increased the one-year deposit rate from
0.6% to 0.72% (per month) in September 1988. But the overheated economy was not
cooled down. Public panic pushed the PBOC to increase the interest rate again in
February 1989. The one-year deposit interest rate (per month) reached 0.945 %.
The overheated economy began to cool down in the second half of 1989.
Unfortunately, the economy suddenly suffered from severe depression. Government then
released tight economic policy. Deposit rates started to drop after April 1990. The interest
rate decreased three times during this period: on 1990.4.15, 1990.8.21 and 1991.4.21. The
one-year deposit interest rate dropped to 0.63 %( per month) to stimulate economic
recovery.
Aside from inflation, the economy has grown in a stable manner since 1992. The
PBOC again increased interest rates in May and July, 1993. The one-year deposit interest
rate reached its peak at 0.915% (per month). China’s interest rate stayed at a very high
level from 1993 to 1996. Although the PBOC implemented high interest rate policy, the
inflation rate was still very high. The PBOC had to execute the subsidy rate for valuepreserved savings to protect depositors. The subsidy rate was only 0.19% in 1994.3, and
then increased to 1.324% in 1995.12. Inflation returned to a normal level, according to
interest rate policy targets. The speed of economic development slowed down after 1996.
Fixed investment decreased. The PBOC adjusted interest rates eight times during the
period 1996 - 2002 to stimulate economic growth. High frequency of interest rate
decrease did not meliorate the economy. Consumption demand was still insufficient and
saving kept increasing even when the interest rate was very low. After June, 2004, the
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domestic price level increased more than 5% in the five months following. The PBOC
decided to increase the interest rate in order to control inflation. This was the first interest
rate increase in nine years.
Major Changes to Interest Rate Policy after 1978
As previously discussed, during 1958 to 1976 the interest rate policy was abandoned
entirely. Since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978, the interest rate has been
recognized as an important monetary policy instrument. Although interest rates are still
heavily administered, its role has become increasingly important. There have been major
changes to interest rate policy:
Interest rates have been adjusted more frequently after 1979. In order to take account for
changing economic circumstances, the PBOC frequently adjusts the interest rate. As we
can see in Table 10, the PBOC adjusted the banking institutions’ deposit rates 20 times in
the period1979 - 1998. In the 3-year period from 1995-1998, there were eight interest rate
adjustments.
One-Year
Real

One-Year

Time and Date

One-Year

Nominal

One-Year

Working

Nominal

Working

Real

Capital

Deposit

Capital

Inflation

Deposit

Lending

Lending Rate

Rate

Rate

Rate

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

of Interest Rate Rate
Change
1978

(%)
3.24

5.04
63

0.7

2.54

4.34

4/1/1979

3.96

5.04

2

1.96

3.04

4/1/1980

5.4

5.04

6

-0.6

-0.96

1981

5.4

5.04

2.4

3

2.64

4/1/1982

5.76

7.2

1.9

3.86

5.3

1983

5.76

7.2

1.5

4.26

5.7

1984

5.76

7.2

2.8

2.96

4.4

4/1/1985

6.84

7.92

8.8

-1.96

-0.88

8/1/1985

7.2

7.92

8.8

-1.6

-0.88

1986

7.2

7.92

6

1.2

1.92

1987

7.2

7.92

7.3

-0.1

0.62

9/1/1988

8.64

9

18.5

-9.86

-9.5

2/1/1989

11.34

11.34

17.8

-6.46

-6.46

4/15/1990

10.08

10.08

2.1

7.98

7.98

8/21/1990

8.64

9.36

2.1

6.54

7.26

4/21/1991

7.56

8.64

2.9

4.66

5.74

1992

7.56

8.64

5.4

2.16

3.24

5/15/1993

9.18

9.36

13.2

-4.02

-3.84

7/11/1993

10.98

10.98

13.2

-2.22

-2.22

1994

10.98

10.98

21.7

-10.72

-10.72

1/1/1995

10.98

10.98

14.8

-3.82

-3.82

7/1/1995

10.98

12.06

14.8

-3.82

-2.74

5/1/1996

9.18

10.98

6.1

3.08

4.88
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8/23/1996

7.47

10.08

6.1

1.37

3.98

10/23/1997

5.67

8.64

0.8

4.87

7.84

3/25/1998

5.22

7.92

-2.6

7.82

10.52

7/1/1998

4.77

6.93

-2.6

7.37

9.53

12/7/1998

3.78

6.39

-2.6

6.38

8.99

Table 10 Interest Rate Adjustment from 1979 to 1998
Banking institutions have been allowed some flexibility in adjusting their own
lending rates. As mentioned earlier, state-owned banks and other commercial banks have
been allowed to adjust working capital lending rates within a margin which was set by
the PBOC above the administered rate. At the beginning of economic development in
China, the major problem was a lack of funds. Government introduced the interest rate
mechanism in order to absorb large idle funds by paying a high interest rate. One part of
funds was directly assigned by government to specific industrial departments or districted
according to government’s economic development strategy. Another part of funds was
offered by banks to companies in different industries, using the interest rate mechanism.
Different industries would have different interest rate policies to cooperate with the
government’s economic development strategy. The right to change interest rates was
strictly controlled by the government. Authorizing margins to banks was also a measure
taken to achieve the economic development strategy. Instead of letting banks set their
own interest rate, the main purpose for authorizing margins to banks was to balance the
distribution of funds which still carried the artificial characteristics of the planned
economy. With the rapid economic development, severe imbalances emerged in different
districts, especially between the rural area and the urban area. As mentioned earlier, profit
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seeking banks transferred large amounts of funds from rural areas to urban areas and then
to the eastern coastal areas where the economy was well developed. This imbalanced
distribution of funds contradicted the original purpose of the government’s economic
plan. First, government expected a higher speed of urbanization and modernization in the
rural area. Unfortunately, large parts of funds which were intended to speed up
urbanization were instead absorbed by cities because of the high profit possibilities.
Second, funds from rural area were also largely absorbed by industry which caused a lack
of funds for agriculture. In order to better this situation, government set the different
margin directly. From 1987 to 1995, this margin was 20% (that is , if the administered
rate is 10%, the upper ceiling of the working capital lending rate for banking institutions
is 12%) (The Process of China’s Interest Rate Liberalisation,1999,Jing, Xuecheng and
BingxiShen). The margin set dropped to 10% during the period 1995 - 1998. Compare to
state-owned banks and commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions had more
flexibility in setting their interest rate. According to the data, the margin set for rural
credit cooperatives was 60%, urban credit cooperatives was 30% and trust and
investment companies was 20% (Mehran, H.,M. Quintyn, T.Nordman and B.
Laurens,1996, Monetary and Exchange System Reform in China: an Experiment in
Gradualism, IMF). We can see that the margin for financial companies in rural area was
much higher than that of banks in urban areas. As the government expected, high interest
rates did attract large funds back to rural areas. But this bold policy also induced serious
problems: the high interest rate offered by rural financial organizations (rural credit
cooperatives, urban credit cooperatives, etc.) impacted the amount of savings of other
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urban financial organizations which was the main resource of industrial development in
urban areas. Urban industry was badly hit by the abnormal funds transfer. Second, high
interest rates became a huge burden for rural financial companies. Operating cost
increased and accumulation of funds decreased. Meanwhile, a lot of rural financial
organizations could not afford this high interest rate because they did not have channels
to make good use of these funds. Finally, rural financial organizations had to offer these
funds to companies in the city (not in the rural areas) to get comparatively high profit as
the last resort in order to pay the high interest rate.
Interest rates have been diversified. The PBOC set administrative ceilings on the
interbank rate before 1996 in the interbank market. According to the operation of the
unified interbank money market, the administrative ceilings on interbank rates were
phased out. In addition, the PBOC started to conduct its market-based operations through
repurchasing short-term securities. The rate of the security repurchase was determined
through a bidding process involving market participants (Yanfen Huang, The Money
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.108). In the bond market, the interest
rates of government bonds were administratively determined before 1995. The first dealer
auction of short-term government bonds was introduced in 1995. Then government
started to issue bonds in 1996 using a competitive bidding system (except in 1997 and
1998). In the meantime, the PBOC also determined the ceiling for enterprise bonds’
interest rate. The ceiling was 140% of the bank deposit rates with the same maturity
according to the “Provisional Regulation on Enterprise Bonds”. After 1991, this ceiling
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was lowered down to 120% of the bank deposit rate with the same maturity (Yanfen
Huang, The Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.108).
Some Issues with the Current Interest Rate System
One of the interest rate setting principles in China is that the PBOC needs to take the
profitability of firms and the state banks into account. According to Karl Marx’s theory,
average profit can be divided into two parts: interest profit and enterprise profit. Thus, on
the one hand, the lending rate should be lower than the average profit rate. On the other
hand, the lending rates still need to guarantee the profitability of state-owned enterprises
and state banks. In practice, the “average profit rate” is very abstract. It is almost
impossible for the PBOC to know the level of the average profit rate accurately. The
PBOC then sets the lending rates based on the banks’ average cost of funds plus an
intermediation margin considered to be adequate (Yanfen Huang, The Money Supply
Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.110). This interest rate setting process is very
subjective. Also, interest rates are used as a tool for industrial and regional policy. Instead
of setting a market-oriented interest rate, interest rates may be set at levels that reflect
political objectives. Thus, interest rates may be incompatible with market conditions.
Also, the interest rate decision-making process is complex and time consuming (Ping Xie,
“Toward a Market-Oriented Interest Rate Policy in the Transformation of China’s
Economy”, in: Interest Rate Liberalization and Money Market Development, 145-154). It
is very difficult for the PBOC to manage the large number of different interest rates. The
PBOC cannot adjust the corresponding process between the PBOC and the relevant
ministries in time, and all the decisions must be approved by the State Council. As we
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can see in Table 10 and Figure 8, interest rate adjustment often lagged behind the changes
in inflation rate.

Figure 8 Interest Rate Adjustment from 1979 to 1998
There is no transmission mechanism in the interest rate system. Usually, in a market
economy system, the central bank can change its base rate, like the rediscount rate, to
implement monetary policy. The changes of the interest rate may affect banks’ liquidity
and then change the money market interest rates. In response to the changes in the
rediscount rates and interbank rates, banking institutions may change their own lending
rate which affects investment decisions. Banking institutions will also change the deposit
rates which will further affect the choice between consuming now and later. The greater
and more rapid the response of lending and deposit rates to changes in rediscount rates
and money market rates, the more rapid and effective the transmission of monetary policy
measures to the real economy (Yanfen Huang, The Money Supply Process and Monetary
Policy in China, p.115). Instead of letting banking institutions determine their own
interest rate, in China the PBOC determines both central bank rates and bank rates. The
PBOC adjusts these interest rates almost at the same time. There is no transmission
69

mechanism from the central bank rates to the bank rates. Banking institutions have no
autonomy in setting their own interest rates unless the PBOC adjusts bank lending rates.
This results in a barrier between the money market rate and the bank rates. Although the
PBOC may also adjust bank rates, such adjustment often has a lag and cannot reflect the
behavior or response of banking institutions. Lack of interest rate setting autonomy by
banks will have some negative implications. Although banks can have a floating margin
to adjust the interest rate based on a benchmark loan and deposit rate which is often
determined by the PBOC in some situations, cases which can meet the changing interest
rate requirements are rare. Most of the time, banks use the benchmark loan and deposit
rate during business. The central banks controls bank interest including interest type,
level, floating margin, even the interest bearing manner. Too many things that needed to
be taken of forced the PBOC to bite off more than it can chew (e.g., loan interest rates).
The benchmark loan rate is mostly determined by maturity; risk is less considered. All
working capital loans and fixed asset loans have the same interest rate, no matter the
difference of industry and profit rate. This induces a situation in which high-profit
enterprises are eager to borrow. On the other hand, the loan interest rate will become a
serious burden for enterprises with low-profit margins. Different industries have different
profit margins and payback periods. This kind of inelastic interest rate policy cannot
optimize the utilization of funds. The original function of the interest rate is now less
effective without the guidance of market force. Government could loosen the control of
this strict interest rate and give banks more freedom to adjust the interest rate. The
interest rate would come to be adjusted by the market, high-profit enterprises would be
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able to find lower interest rates, and low profit enterprises would likely face higher rates.
Through this market-orientated interest rate system, the economy could become more
efficient.
Exchange Rate Policy
The Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate Policy
Exchange Rate Policy Before 1979
From 1949 to the late 1970s, China fixed the exchange rate at a highly overvalued
level because of the import substitution industrialization strategy. Through this economic
planning, the industrial development accelerated and the dependence on imported
manufactured goods was reduced. During this period, China’s main exchange rate policy
included: an overvalued exchange rate, direct controls on imports and exports and tight
controls over foreign exchange. The overvalued exchange rate allowed the government to
import machinery and equipment to some priority industries at a relatively lower cost but
overvalued exchange rate also led to an excess demand for foreign currency. As early as
1950，Chinese authority introduced extensive exchange controls that, among other
things, required the deposit of all sources of foreign exchange, including export earnings,
in the Bank of China (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s
Exchange Rate Policy”, p.3). The overvaluation of the currency depressed the domestic
prices of some traditional export goods, inducing the drop of production of export goods.
In order to solve this problem, government required producers to achieve a specific level
of output. These products would be sold to state trading companies and then to the
international market.
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Exchange Rate Policy in the 1990s
Since the mid-1990s, China’s exchange rate system began to move to a system in
which the value of its currency was determined by supply and demand in the foreign
exchange market. The Chinese government eased controls on trade and other current
account transactions. The State Council approved a system which allowed exporters and
their local government to retain a share of their foreign exchange earnings. In the
meantime, local government was allowed to regain a part of the foreign exchange
earnings from nontrade sources, such as overseas remittances and tourism. This policy
stimulated the development of exports and other sources of foreign exchange. In the mid1980s, the government sanctioned foreign exchange markets (swap centers) in several
cities. The initial target for sanctioning foreign exchange markets was controlling the
price of foreign currency. But the volume of transactions expanded tremendously and the
initial restrictions on participation in these markets gradually eroded. Foreign exchange
transactions reached 13 billion dollars in 1990. On the open foreign exchange market, the
price invariably displayed a premium to the official exchange rate. This situation clearly
showed the overvaluation of the renmibi by the official exchange rate.
Another policy instrument the government used to move the currency toward a
market-determined rate was devaluation. The State Council introduced an “internal
settlement rate” of RMB2.8 to the US dollar in January 1981 (Morris Goldstein and
Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.5). Compare to the
official exchange rate – RMB1.5, the new rate was nearly 100 percent higher. This
measure introduced a dual exchange rate system. The official exchange rate was applied
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to nontrade transactions. In 1985, the internal settlement rate was abolished and all
transactions were settled at the official exchange rate. The official exchange rate
continued to devaluate over the next few years. The exchange rate dropped to RMB5.8 at
year-end 1993. On January 1, 1994, the government unified official exchange rate
decreased to RMB8.7. In the next 18 months, the government revalued the currency
several times. In October 1997, the exchange rate was set to RMB8.28. Then through
October 1997 to July 2005, the exchange rate fluctuated in a very narrow range around
RMB8.28.Renminbi was undervalued for a long time. One main reason for this
undervaluation is related to China’s export policy. Developing exports was a major target
of the Chinese government in its plan to increase economic growth. In order to accelerate
economic development, the Chinese government has implemented policies which
encourage exports since the 1990s. During the 1990s a large part of economic
development was stimulated by exports. In the 1980s, the average contribution of exports
to economic growth was only 0.5%. The contribution increased to 7.5% during the
1990s.In 1990s, the insufficient demand and the Asian financial crisis led the Chinese
government to make an effort to expand exports in order to stimulate economic growth.
A focus on exports shows high exchange rate dependence. Implementing the reminbi
undervaluation policy would drive the exports.
Development of Exchange Policy since mid-2005
On July 21, 2005 China had a new currency regime. The government not only revalued
the official bilateral rate by 2.1 percent, appreciated from RMB8.28 to RMB8.11 to the
dollar but also announced that the exchange rate policy of renminbi would change from
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being pegged to the dollar to being managed “with reference to a basket of currencies”.
The PBOC also announced that the exchange rate would become more flexible and its
value would be determined by “market supply and demand”. The nominal renmibi-dollar
rate was RMB6.83 by the end of 2008. Compare to the exchange rate in July 2005,
renminbi was appreciated by 21 percent. As we can see in Table 11, the exchange rate of
renminbi relative to the dollar fluctuated in a small range during this period. Although
Chinese government launched the “basket” exchange rate policy, empirical studies
(Eichengreen 2004b; Frankel and Wei 2007, 2008) have found that the renminbi
continued to track the US dollar instead of managing the renminbi with reference to a
basket of currencies.
Appreciation (percent)
Month
Year

Date

Rate

Annualized
(over previous
(month*12)
month)

2005

2006

June 30

8.277

July29

8.108

2.1

24.9

August 31

8.097

0.1

1.6

September 30

8.093

0.1

0.6

October 31

8.084

0.1

1.3

November 30

8.080

0.1

0.7

December 31

8.070

0.1

1.4

January 27

8.061

0.1

1.4
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2007

February 28

8.042

0.2

2.9

March 31

8.017

0.3

3.7

April 28

8.017

0.0

0.1

May 31

8.019

0.0

-0.3

June 30

7.996

0.3

3.5

July 31

7.973

0.3

3.4

August 31

7.959

0.2

2.2

September 29

7.909

0.6

7.6

October 31

7.879

0.4

4.5

November 30

7.844

0.5

5.4

December 29

7.809

0.4

5.4

January 31

7.778

0.4

4.8

February 28

7.741

0.5

5.7

March 30

7.734

0.1

1.0

April 30

7.706

0.4

4.5

May 31

7.651

0.7

8.6

June 29

7.616

0.5

5.5

July 31

7.574

0.6

6.6

August 31

7.561

0.2

2.1

September 28

7.511

0.7

8.0

October 31

7.469

0.6

6.7

November 30

7.400

0.9

11.3
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2008

December 31

7.305

1.3

15.6

January 31

7.185

1.7

19.9

February 29

7.106

1.1

13.4

March 31

7.019

1.2

14.8

April 31

7.000

0.3

3.2

May 30

6.947

0.8

9.2

June 30

6.859

1.3

15.4

July 31

6.839

0.3

3.6

August 29

6.835

0.1

0.8

September 26

6.818

0.2

2.9

October 31

6.826

-0.1

-1.3

November 28

6.835

-0.1

-1.6

6.835

0.0

0.1

December 31

Table 11 The Exchange Rate of RMB from 2005 to 2008
Through mid-2008, the Chinese government took two steps to reinforce appreciation
of the renminbi. First, the value-added tax (VAT) rebates for producers of exported goods
were canceled in September 2006.This policy increased the final cost of producing
exports. In June 2007, Chinese authorities adjusted the rate of rebate of 37 percent of all
export products, including eliminating rebates of 553 products and reducing the rebate
rate of 2268 products. This measure would noticeably affect export production. In the
meantime, the government introduced changes to the export processing regime that
increased the costs of assembling exports from imported parts and components, thus
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reducing the competitiveness of these goods on international markets (Morris Goldstein
and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.20). The
authorities added 1950 products to the restricted list for import processing.
Due to the policy, China’s current account surplus expanded dramatically. The
current account surplus reached $68.7 billion (3.6 percent of GDP) in 2004, and then rose
to $160.8 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 2005, $250 billion (9.4 percent of GDP) in 2006
and $372 billion (11 percent of GDP) in 2007. In 2008, China’s current account surplus
was $426 billion, 9.8 percent of GDP. The official holdings of foreign exchange reserves
are also accelerated. Government intervention in the market increased sharply. China’s
currency became increasingly undervalued. The estimated degree of undervaluation was
23 percent in July 2005. Although the 2.1 percent appreciation at the end of 2005 slightly
reduced the degree of undervaluation, the speed of real appreciation was slowed down in
2006 and 2007.
Challenges under the Existing Currency Regime
Although Chinese authority declared that the exchange rate was flexible, the
renminbi was still floating within a small range. An increasing undervalued exchange rate,
a rapid expanding current account surplus and the accelerating buildup of foreign
exchange reserves pose several challenges for the Chinese government.
A fixed exchange rate regime will impose constraints on a country’s monetary
policy because the divergence between domestic interest rates and foreign rates will
result in destabilizing capital flows. Theoretically, capital control can prevent large
inflows or outflows. But it is difficult to maintain effective controls in practice. Even if
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capital control can be implemented effectively, significant foreign exchange purchase
will lead to an increase in the domestic money supply. If the government cannot sterilize
the increase in money supply, inflation will become severe and the real exchange rate
will appreciate. Meanwhile, the Chinese government needs to sell these huge quantities
of sterilization bonds which will induce an interest rate increase (the central bank must
pay on these bonds). Finally, that interest may exceed the earnings from the bank’s
holdings of interest-bearing foreign currency-denominated financial assets, imposing a
substantial financial constraint on sterilization operations (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas
R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.28). Goldstein and Lardy
argued that China’s fixed exchange rate already diminished the effectiveness of monetary
policy and that this erosion is likely to continue. Thus increased currency flexibility is
needed to reduce the risks of macroeconomic instability, whether of domestic or external
origin (Goldstein and Lardy 2006b). When the central bank controlled the growth of
monetary aggregates by imposing quotas on loans it led to an inefficient process. Banks
could only follow the “window guidance” on bank lending. This process was not led by
the interest rate. Without the guidance of market signal, the allocation of credit may be
less efficient. This school believed that the resultant policy mix left China with an interest
rate structure that was far from optimum (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The
Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.29). On the lending side, real interest rates
were low to fulfill a rapid development of the economy. Deposit rates were also very low
on the saving side as well. For example, the ceiling that banks could pay on demand
deposits in 2008 was 0.72 percent and on one-year deposits rate was 3.33 percent. Taking
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into account the 7.9 percent inflation rate and a 5 percent tax on interest income, the real
interest rate after tax was negative. Negative real returns on bank savings was the main
factor which caused the boom in the residential property market. This periodic real estate
booms heighten huge financial risks
For a while after 1994, the exchange rate of renminbi fluctuated around RMB 8.3 to
the dollar. This undervalued exchange rate caused China’s trade and current account
surplus began to soar. The increase of foreign exchange reserves pushed government
invest large amount of funds in developed countries. Unfortunately, the state investment
in China was still immature. Huge foreign funds were lost due to improper investments.
Another view on current renminbi exchange rate is that going much beyond the
existing gradualist approach to currency reform would be too dangerous for the fragile
banking system. Large appreciation of renminbi could induce serious currency
mismatches for banks and their customers. Also, sharp appreciation of renminbi might
reduce growth, making it harder to maintain the declining trend in banks’ nonperforming
loans. China’s financial market has not been well developed. Financial infrastructure
cannot offer market participants hedging instruments adequately to protect them against
an increase in exchange rate volatility. Thus, the bolder currency reform should have a
precondition: a more developed financial system.
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CHAPTER FIVE: INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY
Inflation in China after Economic Reform

Figure 9 CPI from 1985 to 2008
Year

CPI

1985

109.3

1986

106.5

1987

107.3

1988

111.8

1989

118.0

1990

103.1

1991

103.4

1992

106.4

1993

114.7

1994

124.1

1995

117.1

1996

108.3
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1997

102.8

1998

99.2

1999

98.6

2000

100.4

2001

100.7

2002

99.2

2003

101.2

2004

103.9

2005

101.8

2006

101.5

2007

104.8

2008

105.9

Table 12 CPI from 1985 to 2008
As we can see in the Figure 9, the fluctuation of CPI was volatile before late 1990.
Since 1990, China’s inflation has been low and stable.
This dynamic variation in Chinese CPI inflation over the past three decades reflects
changes in the mechanism of Chinese price formation and policy regimes. Before 1978,
China had a fixed price system. In other words, prices of commodities were strictly
administered by the government and changed infrequently. During the economic reform,
the fixed price system was gradually liberalized. In 1979, the central government
initialized a so-called “adjustment and reform” policy officially with the official goal of
promoting fast development in both the industrial and agriculture sectors. Then the fixed
price system was increasingly liberalized. The prices of industrial and agricultrual
products increased dramatically in the early 1980s. This rise in the price level inevitably
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passed through the production chain and induced high inflation. The growth rate of real
output in the early 1980s was also at a high level in with the rapidly rising prices.
However, countercyclical economic policies were not implemented efficiently and timely.
Both growth rates of M2 and domestic credit still went up in late 1982. The growth rate
reached 40% in 1985 and nearly 50% in 1986. The tightening credit policy in 1986
dampened the inflation but just for a short period. Prices soared as high as 25% in 1988
due to further liberalization and deregulation of prices. Then the central government
immediately tightened money and credit supply and reduced fixed investment. The
tightening policy lasted until the end of the 1980s. Although tightening policy cooled
down the inflation and economic growth, it seemed to overcompensate. During 1988 to
1989, the industrial sector suffered a serious reduction in activity, causing a relatively
low level of both economic growth and inflation (below 5%) over the period 1990-1992.
Deng Xiaoping’s “South China Tour Speech” in 1992 triggered a new round of fast
Chinese economic growth. The central government again loosened credit control which
led to a sharp increase in the economic growth rate and money supply. Inevitably,
inflation started to increase in 1992 and peaked in 1994. Then the inflation rate decreased
through 1995 and further decreased in the late 1990s because of the implementation of a
number of tightening policy measures in 1994. Since the 1990s, China has experienced
mild deflation twice, one in 1998-2000 and again in 2001-2003. The CPI started to grow
in 2007 due to the increase in the price of raw materials, agriculture products, labor costs
and real estate.
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Figure 10 Fluctuation of CPI and GDP Growth Rate from 1985 to 2008
As we can see in the Figure 10, the CPI was highly correlated with GDP growth rate.
In years of high inflation, the Chinese economy also had a high economic growth rate.
Yin Zongcheng also confirmed the viewpoint of the correlation between inflation rate and
economic growth rate in The Study of Correlation between Inflation and Macroeconomic
Fluctuation. He observed that:
1.

CPI would affect macroeconomic fluctuation and macroeconomic
fluctuation could also affect CPI.

2.

Once CPI changed, it would affect the economy causing economic
fluctuation immediately. But on the contrary, the response of CPI to
economic fluctuation had a lag.

There are some changes in the interaction between the price level and the economy
worth mention. (1) At the beginning of economic reform, government implemented a
very strict planning management. Both materials of production and living were deficient.
Supply was severely insufficient. Consumption was inhibited for a long time. With the
development of the economy, investment increased. The limit on consumption began to
be released. As prices were deregulated, both investment needs and consumption needs
affected the CPI tremendously. This situation has changed since 1997. Rapid
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development in both quality and quantity of agricultural products and consumer goods
helped the Chinese economy move to a comparatively surplus status. Then the influence
of the insufficiency of supply on the CPI began to decrease. In the meantime, the impact
of price deregulation on the CPI diminished. China started to loosen price control in 1978.
This implementation caused an increase in the CPI. The deregulation of pricing for
agricultural products and consumer goods had finished in 1997; the effect of price control
on the CPI had been eliminated. (2) Since 1978, the Chinese economy has gradually
transferred from being driven by consumption and investment economic development to
being driven by consumption, investment and export economic development drive. As
foreign-trade dependence increases, the overseas market demand plays an important role
in GDP growth. However, as Shedeng Huang and Yanqiu He show, this increased
foreign-trade dependence did not affect the CPI significantly. (3) Consumption structure
changed since economic reform. At the early stage of economic reform, consumption was
composed of primarily, agricultural and consumer goods. The share of other consumption
like real estate, medical and education increased after 1997. But the formula for the
Chinese CPI cannot reflect all these consumptions, especially that of real estate, which is
now experiencing a price boom.
Inflation and Changes to Monetary Policy
As we can see in Figure 10, China’s inflation was low and stable after 1997.
Chengsi Zhang and Joel Clovis mentioned in “China Inflation Dynamics: Persistence and
Policy Regimes”, this low inflation was very likely to be associated with policy regime
shifts in China. First, the role of the PBOC as the central bank of China had been
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strengthened since the mid-1990s. Although the PBOC assumed its responsibility as a
central bank in 1983, its role as a central bank was not legally confirmed until 1995.
Since the PBOC began to have the ability to implement monetary policy, monetary policy
implementation has gradually improved. The PBOC abolished the quota management of
credit and implemented the assets-to-liabilities ratio management in 1998. In 1999, the
PBOC set up nine regional branches to promote policy efficiency instead of branches at
provincial and municipal levels.
“ Since the end of the 1990s, the PBOC has adopted a composite measure of
quantity-based (e.g. money supply) and price-based (e.g, interest rate) tools for
implementing its policies, with the quantity-based tool being a predominant
policy instrument. As such, the reforms over the last decade have been turning the
PBOC into a more “traditional” central bank that relies on comprehensive tools to
accomplish its ends in a more sufficient manner.” (Chengsi Zhang, Joel Clovis,
“China Inflation Dynamics: Persistence and Policy Regimes”, p.379).
There are two viewpoints: one is that China’s low inflation rate is a result of changes
to monetary policy. People believe the PBOC has begun to stabilize inflation around a
potential long-run target and has gained credibility with the public and it will continue to
do so. Another viewpoint, like the interpretation found in the analysis of Stock and
Watson (2007), is that the decline of inflation persistence may only reflect the fact that
the nature of “shocks” has changed. If the first viewpoint is right, a better monetary
policy has resulted in a better anchoring of inflation expectations. Mishkin (2007) argued
that better monetary policy reduced inflation persistence by anchoring inflation
expectations. Unlike the simple intervention during 1980s and 1990s, the PBOC has
increased its commitment to price stability in both words and actions since the late 1990s.
Compared with the sharp upswings and downswings during the 1980s and 1990s, the
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preemptive strikes against the volatile movement of the inflation rate by the PBOC
resulted in a low and stable inflation since the late 1990s.
Policy Implication
Response of Inflation to Structural Shock
A very interesting finding is that the response of inflation in China to demand
shock, supply shock, and monetary policy shock diminished more quickly over the post1997 period. Also, the responses of inflation to supply shock and monetary policy
shocks seemed more striking than that of inflation to aggregate demand shock. In the
pre-1997 period, it took about two years for inflation to revert to an equilibrium level
when it has been perturbed by a supply or monetary policy shock. The “rebound” time
span reduced from two years to one year after 1997. Also, the time span for inflation to
return to a steady level following a disturbance in aggregate demand was reduced from
four years to less than three years. This research suggests that, compared to a decade ago,
the underlying shocks are less likely to induce serious economic instability today in
China. However, this conclusion does not mean that the central bank should pay less
attention to shocks and be confident that inflation rate will stay at a low level. As
mentioned before, the comparatively low inflation after 1997 was mainly due to the
improvement of monetary policy. Other factors can also spark inflation. As international
trade become more and more important to the Chinese economy, the central government
needs to keep an eye on both internal and external shocks.
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Inflation Expectations and Inflation Control
Recent studies conducted by Mishkin(2007) have pointed out that better monetary
policy produced better anchors of inflation expectations which could lead to less
persistent inflation. Before the late 1990s, as mentioned, monetary policy in China was
inefficient and unsuccessful in controlling inflation. Poor inflation control resulted in
poorly anchored inflation expectations. In the late 1980s, high inflation expectations in
the future were strong because of the aggressive price liberalization. The inflation
expectations have been much better anchored since the late 1990s due to better monetary
policy.

Figure 11 Chinese CPI Inflation and Survey of Inflation Expectations
As we can see in Figure 11, most of the time, inflation expectations were lower than
actual inflation. This also reaffirms the fact that the structural change in Chinese inflation
is mainly attributed to better monetary policy and better anchoring of inflation
expectations. But, as I mentioned, this does not mean that the central bank should pay
less attention to shocks and be confident that the inflation rate will stay at a low level.
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Other factors will still impact inflation. Since the recession of 2008, the Chinese
government has launched expansionary monetary policy in conjunction with a proactive
fiscal policy. At the time of my writing, China’s CPI has already reached 6.2% and
doesn’t show signs of slowing. China still needs to make efforts to adjust its economic
policy in order to improve its efficiency during the reaction to economic shocks. Aside
from the monetary steps against internal and external shocks, China still needs to improve
the flexibility of its exchange rate regime in order to have a better international economic
environment. A comparatively flexible exchange rate system can reduce economic
shocks to some extent. First, exchange rate flexibility can help the government prevent
large foreign exchange reserve loss or surplus because it no longer has the duty to
maintain a specific exchange rate. When the renminbi appreciates, the central bank does
not need to sell yuan and buy dollars to stabilize the renminbi value. Exchange rate
flexibility can balance the payment. The exchange rate is affected by market conditions.
If a country is experiencing a serious balance of payments deficit, its currency will
depreciate and vice versa. Through such mechanisms, exchange flexibility can decrease
government’s dependence on direct intervention and increase the efficiency of resource
allocation. Third, exchange rate flexibility can cushion the blow of hot money. In the
fixed exchange rate system, the nominal exchange rate likely deviates from the
equilibrium exchange rate. If the currency is undervalued and facing appreciation
pressure, hot money will largely be transferred to the country for speculative purpose. For
example, the RMB has been devaluated in the last few years, and an enormous amount of
international floating capital has flooded the Chinese market which increased the pressure
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of RMB’s appreciation. Exchange rate flexibility can prevent serious deviation between
the actual exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate. These mechanisms decrease
the possibility of international capital attack. Fourth, flexibility of the exchange rate can
minimize the transmission of economic fluctuation and inflation. Countries which have a
high degree of trade dependence are easily affected by inflation and economic
fluctuations of their trading partners under a fixed exchange rate system. On the contrary,
under a floating exchange rate system, if a country suffers serious inflation, the currency
will depreciate. The increased domestic currency price of export goods will be largely
offset by the depreciation of currency. As a result, the price of export goods in foreign
currencies will not change too much. So, the trading partners incur less price pressure.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
There has been more than 30 years since economic reform. Impressive economic
development has taken place over these 30 years. The Chinese economy has gradually
transferred from a planned economy to a market economy. In Chapter Two, I illustrated
all five business cycles which have occurred over the past 30 years. Chapter Three
mainly focuses on China’s financial background, including institutional condition,
banking system, economic reform and existing problems. This background introduction
gives a clearer picture of China’s financial situation and implementation of monetary
policy. I also analyzed some aspects of China’s monetary policy such as the credit plan,
interest rate, and exchange rate and discussed China’s inflation situation and some
relevant monetary policy decisions. Compare to business cycles before economic reform,
we find that the business cycles after 1978 were much more stable and lasted longer and
the period became longer. Although the Chinese economy is developing quickly, it still
faces many issues. Compared with developed countries like the United States,
government intervention is much more frequent in China. Business cycles in China are
more like “policy-induced growth cycles”. The Chinese government wants to stimulate
economic growth so it artificially expands the credit. Investment then increases as well.
But significant investment leads to an overheated economy. In order to control the
overheated economy and inflation, government tightens the fiscal and monetary policy to
drag the economy back to a normal status. When the economy depresses, this process
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starts again. Also, in China, the PBOC determines both central bank rates and bank rates
instead of letting banking institutions determine their own interest rate. Banks must use
the benchmark loan and deposit rate while conducting business. All working capital loans
and fixed assets loans have the same interest rate, despite difference in industry and profit
rate. High- profit borrowers and low- profit borrowers have the same interest rate which
induces concerning imbalances. Since the decentralization of the government, local
governments always expand credit because they are eager to see high-speed economic
development. As a result, the PBOC has more has more difficulty controlling the
availability of credit without over-stimulating the whole economy because the objective
of monetary policy is subordinate to government’s economic development target. The
PBOC has the responsibility to cooperate with government to achieve the economic
target. Then the policy induced growth cycle starts and inflation rises. Once inflation
reaches a high level, government must use monetary policy to constrain credit and lower
the inflation rate which causes the economy to decline.
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